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INTRODUCTION

T

evolved
the mid-twentieth century,
has, since
systempolicy
U.S. tort
he bring
particular
emphasis to the problem of compensating
to
victims of accidental injury.' Much of the focus has shifted from the
wrongfulness of the conduct of the tortfeasors-and the corresponding
need for both accountability and deterrence-toward the needs of the
injured, particularly as the cost of medical treatment has skyrocketed. 2
The tort system's efforts to remedy the problem-accident victims'
inability to pay for the medical care they require-has, this article
argues, distorted the policy objectives and priorities of the tort system

1 J. Clark Kelso, Sixty Years of Torts: Lessonsfor the Future, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 710 (1993).
2 See infra Part I.
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and has contributed to the widely perceived "tortcrisis." 3 Accordingly,
a national health insurance program that provides health care to
everyone ("Universal Care"), such as the Medicare-for-All bills now
being suggested in Congress, would go far toward curing the ills of our
tort system.
Because our current system of medical care cannot begin to meet the
needs of the injured-often because those injured individuals were
uninsured or underinsured, and because the medical expenses are
prohibitively high-injured individuals have increasingly resorted to
the tort system in an effort to find a way to pay for necessary medical
care.4 Judges have responded by adapting tort doctrines to do a better
job of compensating victims of injury, invoking policy principles like
loss spreading, and replacing tort concepts such as contributory
negligence and assumption of risk (the application of which blocked
tort recovery) with far more flexible and generous doctrines, such as
comparative negligence, strict products liability, joint and several
liability, and vicarious liability.5 In so doing, the tort system has
attempted to play a role more akin to that of an insurer, effectively
compensating for the healthcare system's failure to address issues of
access to medical care, or, perhaps more pointedly, the health insurance
system's failure to accomplish the attendant goals of loss-spreading and
risk-spreading.
At the same time-and probably not coincidentally-the tort system
has fallen into disrepute in the United States, with critics decrying the
excesses of the system: awarding damages when the defendants'
malfeasance or misfeasance was arguable and, in some highly
publicized and highly criticized cases, awarding multimillion-dollar
judgments to plaintiffs who, at first blush, appear to be unworthy of
such a windfall. 6 A few injured people appear, to a lay observer, to be
getting rich off the system, while many others get clearly inadequate
compensation or none at all. Even those who recover their full losses
by verdict or settlement may end up short-changed by thirty to forty
percent after their attorneys are compensated from the judgment
proceeds.

3 See Wallace M. Rudolph, The Tort Crisis: Causes, Solutions, and the Constitution, 11
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 659, 659-60 (1988).
4 See infra Section I.B.1.
5 See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
6 See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
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The condemnation of the tort system, however, is misplaced. The
problem is not that the tort system has failed to do its job, but that the
tort system has failed to do the healthcare system's job. Indeed, it is the
healthcare market that should be entrusted with the efficient delivery
of effective care to those who need it at fair and competitive prices. But
the healthcare system has utterly failed in this regard: market failures
have resulted in a system that is inefficient and overpriced when
compared with virtually every other healthcare system in the worldand therefore one that is inaccessible to many who need the care. The
tort system, therefore, has become a go-to resource for covering
otherwise prohibitive medical expenses for those injured in accidents,7
and courts and legislatures have responded, as noted above, by
broadening liability rules in an effort to help these accident victims get
access to some compensation via an available deep pocket. If the
healthcare system, or market, cannot ensure access to health care,
sometimes the tort system can compensate for that. But in and amidst
its attempts to do so, the tort system has been compromised. 8
Thrust into a role it was never designed for, the tort system has
unsurprisingly done a poor job of ensuring access to health care across
the board. Liability must be established before the payment can be
made, and that requires enormously expensive and inefficient ad hoc
legal determinations. Indeed, critics of the tort system are justified in
their complaints that tort relief is not necessarily going to the most
deserving victims, and that such relief is made in inconsistent and
indefensible amounts. 9 But the tort reform policy debate has focused
too much on the failures of the tort system, overlooking the degree to
which the problems have been generated by failures of the healthcare
system. It is hardly reasonable, much less fair, to blame the tort system
for its inability to compensate for, or fix, the problem of a failed system
for the delivery of medical care to those who need it.
Universal Care initiatives, including Medicare-for-All, are now being
proposed, debated, and discussed, and appear be gaining unprecedented
7 Julie Davies, Reforming the Tort Reform Agenda, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 119, 124
(2007) (acknowledging "the fact that that uninsured Americans are forced by need to seek
de facto health coverage through the tort system when they are injured.").
8 It is obviously reductionist to suggest that the desire to better compensate plaintiffs is
the impetus for disrupting traditional tort doctrines, orthat it is the sole cause of the problems
the tort system presently faces. As this article attempts to demonstrate, there are compelling
reasons to attribute at least some blame for the public's loss of confidence in the tort system
to compensation-focused shifts in tort doctrine.
9 See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
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momentum as it becomes clear that the Affordable Care Act cannot
resolve the core problems in our health care system. In this discussion
and debate, we should note how far a functional healthcare delivery
system-one that ensured that every injured person would have their
basic medical needs met-would go to relieve this tremendous burden
on the tort system, a burden that has distorted the tort system's
priorities, and forced it into a role it was never equipped to perform.
Many injured individuals would have little cause to sue, as their most
pressing need-appropriate medical care-would already be met.
Accordingly, Universal Care may be just what the tort system needs to
get itself back on track and focus, not on finding a deep pocket and
crafting legal doctrines that would force that defendant to fund the
treatment, but on allocating liability to-and demanding accountability
from, those whose conduct falls short of societal standards.
The potential impact of Universal Care on the tort system was
explored by Professor Gary Schwartz in 1994, based on his initial
perception that adoption of Universal Care was imminent in the United
States:
[A] national health care program would affect the claiming patterns
of tort victims, the attitudes of tort juries in deciding cases, and the
development by judges of tort doctrine. Given the[se] foreseeable
effects, such a program, in achieving health care reform, could also
bring about tort reform, restraining the scope and cost of the overall
tort system.10

In 2007, over a dozen years later, Professor Julie Davies argued that
the tort reform agenda might be well served by initiatives to broaden
health care accessibility, and that these two initiatives-tort reform and
healthcare reform-should be merged."
Of course, the Universal Care envisioned by the Clinton
Administration in the early 1990s never materialized, so Professor
Schwartz's predictions went untested. And the Affordable Care Act
("ACA") was adopted in 2009 without an expectation that it would
serve tort reform purposes, so Professor Davies' proposed merger of
the initiatives-(1) addressing the problem of the uninsured in health
care, and (2) addressing the problems of the tort system-never
occurred. Indeed, because the ACA fell far short of the goal of ensuring

10 Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health Care Program: What Its Effect Would Be on
American Tort Law andMalpracticeLaw, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994).

11 Davies, supra note 7.
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full and universal healthcare coverage,1 2 its potential impact to effect
change or reform in the tort system went unrealized.1 3 But now, almost
thirty years after Professor Schwartz first took up the issue, as both
political parties appear to be interested in replacing the ACA with
something different,' 4 the potential for healthcare reform to address
issues in our tort system deserves renewed attention.
Part I of this article begins by discussing the purposes and theories
behind the tort system Part II summarizes the problems of the U.S. tort
system, including the incentives it creates and the inefficiencies it
generates. Part III provides a brief overview ofthe problems of the U.S.
healthcare system, highlighting its extraordinarily high cost. The article
then spells out the promise of Universal Care in Part IV-not just how
it may address the inefficiencies and spiraling costs in healthcare
delivery, but how fixing our healthcare system will relieve an
impossible and unfair burden on the tort system. Part V of the article
concludes by arguing that Universal Care should address some of the
perceived excesses and dysfunction of our present tort system,
answering many of its critics' complaints. The tort system may then be
able to regain its footing, and its own appropriate sense of purpose:
holding tortfeasors accountable for the harm they cause and deterring
tortious conduct, undistracted by a competing imperative to facilitate
plaintiffs' access to deep pockets.

12 Implementation of the ACA coincided with a roughly seven-point reduction in the
percentage of non-elderly Americans without health insurance, from rates of seventeen to
eighteen percent uninsured in the first part of the 2010s, to rates of ten to eleven percent in
the latter part of that decade. Jennifer Tolbert, Kendal Orgera, & Anthony Damico, Key
FactsAbout the UninsuredPopulation,KFF (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.kff.org/uninsured
/issue-brief/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/ [https://penna.cc/9V2X-WMR7].
13 See generally Andrew F. Popper, The Affordable Care Act Is Not Tort Reform, 65
CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2016) (noting that there was very little in the ACA that spoke to issues
of tort reform).
14 By the latter 2010s, many Democrats were advocating to replace the ACA with
something far more comprehensive. Bradley Jones, IncreasingShare ofAmericans Favor a
single Government Program to Provide Health Care Coverage, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 29,
2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/29/increasing-share-of-americans
-favor-a-single-government-program-to-provide-health-care-coverage/
[https://perma.cc
/E8SB-XW28]. Republicans, campaigning against the ACA, promised to "repeal and
replace" the ACA with something better, but even from 2017 to 2019, when they held both
houses of Congress as well as the White House, they were unable to forge any consensus on
what to replace the ACA with. Timeline ofACA Repeal and Replace Efforts, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Timelineof_ACArepealandreplaceefforts
[https://perma.cc
/2TY4-5W9X]; Jonathan Cohn, The ACA, Repeal, and the Politics of Backlash, HEALTH
AFFS. (March 6, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20200305.771008
/full/ [https://perma.cc/4CJ3-DLGQ].
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I
PURPOSES OF THE TORT SYSTEM

The historical policy underlying the tort system is that the person
who unreasonably causes harm should be held accountable and made
to compensate those harmed by her unreasonable behavior.' 5 Indeed,
before the twentieth century, it was treated very much as a private law
matter and generally involved wrongs that society deemed immoral
(e.g., stealing, physical harm, etc.).1 6 It typically involved isolated
instances of wrongdoing and operated as an expression of corrective
justice.' 7 Absent the wrongful conduct (i.e., tortious behavior), the
victim would have remained unharmed; the tortfeasor therefore owes it
to her victim to make it right.' 8 Of course, in the case of personal injury,
the harm is not always reparable (e.g., a disabling injury or loss of
life),' 9 and the courts have necessarily resorted to money damages for
the plaintiff's compensable losses, most conspicuously, perhaps, the
plaintiff's medical expenses-which can be prohibitive, especially in
the United States right now-incurred as a result of the defendant's
tortious behavior. 20
A competing view of tort law, particularly prevalent in the law and
economics literature, focuses on incentives and deterrence.21 The idea
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. L. INST. 1965).

16 John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 522-25
(2003); see also Mark A. Geistfeld, The Coherence of Compensation-DeterrenceTheory in

Tort Law, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 383, 388-89 (2012).
17 Id.
18 See generally Erik Encarnacion, Corrective Justice as Making Amends, 62 BUFF. L.
REV. 451 (2014).
19 See id. at 484-85 (explaining that "it is never possible, strictly speaking, to fully undo
the losses attributable to wrongdoings. There will always be lost time, for instance, that
cannot be given back to the victim.") (emphasis omitted).
20 Indeed, medical expenses and lost wages remain, even today, the most easily
documented and most easily justified damages in a plaintiff's claim, and ultimately of the
settlement or judgment she obtains. Pain and suffering awards are a mostly a twentieth
century phenomenon, and courts have struggled to find functional methods forvaluing them.
Stephen D. Sugarman, A Century of Change in Personal Injury Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
2403, 2413 (2000) ("Although tort law has formally awarded general damages for the pain
and suffering that accompanies personal injuries throughout the twentieth century, the sums
juries award today (and in turn the sums lawyers can win for their clients in settlement of
claims) dwarf those of 100 years ago, even accounting for inflation." (citation omitted));
Seffert v. L.A. Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 345 (Cal. 1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting)
("[T]here is no way of translating pain and suffering into monetary terms.").
21 This school of thought achieved prominence in the latter half of the twentieth century,
led by the writings of Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi, core principles were at play
before that in, for example, Judge Learned Hand's decision in United States v. Carroll
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is not a new one; tort liability was always carried out in a way that
would achieve some level of deterrence of tortious behavior. To an
economist, torts may be viewed as externalities, where one's behavior
imposes costs on other people. In order to provide proper incentives to
potential tortfeasors, we must force them to internalize those costs. If
all costs are fully internalized, we can expect potential tortfeasors to
take efficient levels of precaution, i.e., precautions that are warranted
in terms of the expected cost of the behavior (likelihood of harm x
extent of harm).2 2 This approach suggests that the tort system should
be wielded to promote efficient exercises of precaution and
correspondingly efficient outcomes in society.
But quite independently of deterrence theory, the latter half of the
twentieth century brought a shift in the focus of tort doctrine away from
corrective justice applied to private wrongs, in favor of principles of
collective justice. Based on the idea that society was increasingly
socially interdependent and that the costs of injuries were everyone's
responsibility, 2 3 tort law began to play more of a social engineering
function. Tort was no longer rooted in concepts of moral wrong, but in
terms of public-policy-driven balancing of interests,24 often the
business interest verses the interest of individuals harmed by the
business activity, in which the economic value of the business activity
weighed heavily. 2 5 The shift focused on optimal societal ordering,
rather than corrective justice in the individual case.
Given these competing policy objectives, it is not surprising that a
sharp debate persists among tort scholars about the primary purposes
of the tort system. On the one hand, the "corrective justice" school of
thought-as well as the "civil recourse" school of thought-continue
to adhere to the historical view that tort law is inherently "private law,"
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089 (1972).
22 See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169. Where cost internalization imposes insufficient
incentive to abstain from tortious behavior, the law permits the imposition of punitive
damages to deter particularly egregious conduct, particularly where the costs of
compensating victims are too low to effectively deter such conduct. Robert J. Rhee,
FinancialEconomic Theory ofPunitive Damages, 111 MICH. L. REV. 33, 52 (2012).
23 G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 146-47,

219 (1980).
24 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 15 (1941).

25 See, e.g., Boomerv. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (arguably licensing
a nuisance on the ground that the business's interests which served the community as a
whole outweighed the plaintiffs' right to quiet enjoyment of their property).

2022]

A Curefor What Ails You:
How UniversalHealthcare Can Help Fix Our Tort System

509

and should resolve disputes in a way that does justice between the
affected individuals: the tortfeasor and her victim. 2 6 On the other hand
are scholars who think of tort law more as "public law"-including law
and economics scholars-focus on deterrence, including the overall
minimization of accidents and the efficient investment of resources in
care and precaution.2 7 Their primary interest is not in achieving a just
result in the instant case, or in making a wrongdoer pay for the harms
she or he may have caused, but in creating efficient incentives for future
conduct. 28
More troublesome is an outgrowth of deterrence theory that treats
tort law as a vehicle for compensation and justifies imposition of
liability-including joint and several liability, strict products liability,
and vicarious liability-on the ground that defendants have deeper
pockets and are in a better position to effectively spread these costs. 29
Here we see a departure from the basic concept oftort: that a wrongdoer
should be footing the bill for the harm he or she wrongfully causes. The
focus shifts away from the historical concept of wrongdoing and
toward the concept of facilitating compensation from someone capable
of funding it. 30 Under these conceptions of tort law, judges and courts
assumed a policy-making role, balancing economic and societal
interests as they see fit, in what might be characterized as an inherently
legislative act-and what some have accordingly condemned as an
"unprincipled exercise of political power.",3 i
26 Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
CorrectiveJustice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1802-03 (1997); Michael Wells, Civil Recourse,
Damages-As-Redress, and ConstitutionalTorts, 46 GA. L. REV. 1003, 1009-10 (2012).
27 Schwartz, supra note 26, at 1819. Schwartz argues that these two purposes can be
reconciled in a tort system that effectively serves both purposes, much as criminal law serves
purposes of both retribution and deterrence. Id. at 1834.
28 Id. at 1818.
29 Jeffrey O'Connell & Christopher J. Robinette, The Role of Compensation in Personal
Injury Tort Law: A Response to the Opposite Concerns of Gary Schwartz and Patrick

Atiyah, 32 CONN. L. REV. 137, 146, 153 (1999); see also, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-45 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). None of these authors use
the term "deep pockets" and would probably chafe at such a characterization of their
position. Nonetheless, there is little question that juries can be influenced by a defendant's
deep pockets to find liability and award damages, and tort law's formal recognition of
"compensation" as a policy objective has only facilitated and encouraged their ability to do
so.
30 At the same time, various types of insurance have emerged and have been utilized to
serve the larger purposes of providing compensation, through cost spreading, quite
regardless of concepts of fault or moral wrong. O'Connell & Robinette, supra note 29, at
137-38.
31 Geistfeld, supra note 16, at 384 (citing Goldberg, supra note 16).
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Nonetheless, the compensation priority has taken hold in modern
tort law. As articulated by the Hawai'i Supreme Court: "[T]ort law is
primarily designed to vindicate social policy." 32 And the first social
policy to be vindicated is "compensating injured plaintiffs." 3 3 By the
late 1980s many courts had weighed in to agree that the "compensation
of victims is the main function of tort law." 34 Accordingly, we have
adopted tort doctrines that focus less on accountability, or even
deterrence, and more on finding a way to access a deep pocket so
victims of accidents can get the compensation they need, compensation
that is particularly important in an era of costly medical care. 35 This
approach conceives of the tort system as a type of insurance scheme:
losses are spread industry-wide, with consumers sharing some of that
burden, and in return the public can expect compensation from the
industry for the injuries it inflicts. Uninsured victims thereby get access
to compensation for their injuries. Mark Geistfeld characterized it in
precisely these terms, based in large part on the fact that so few people
have adequate health insurance coverage:
[H]ealth insurance was not widely available in the United States until
the 1950s. Not surprisingly, accidental injuries were often financially
ruinous for individuals in this era. For these reasons, many tort
scholars in the first half of the twentieth century maintained that tort
compensation supplies a justifiable form of insurance for accident
victims. 36

Despite the historical notion that tort liability should be tied to the
wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct and the need to "make it
right," or even to ensure optimal levels of deterrence, twentieth century
trends in tort liability appear, in practice, to have strayed significantly
and unapologetically from those principles. 37 While some torts
scholars may have embraced the shift, 38 public confidence in the system
32 Francis v. Lee Enters., Inc., 971 P.2d 707, 712 (Haw. 1999) (emphasis in original).
33 Steigman v. Outrigger Enters., Inc., 267 P.3d 1238, 1246-47 (Haw. 2011). Notably,
the "second" policy is to "prevent injury . . by providing incentive to deter negligent acts."

Id. at 1247.
34 Stephen Sugarman, Serious Tort Law Reform, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795, 797-98,
798 n.5 (1987) ("The California Supreme Court has been especially candid about viewing
tort law fundamentally as a vehicle for compensating injured victims." (citations omitted)).
35 See John Hasnas, What's Wrong with a Little Tort Reform?, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 557,
570 (1996) ("The thinking seems to have been that compensating injured parties at the
expense of deep pockets who could afford it was not only fair, but would provide an
incentive to avoid the dangerous practices likely to cause injury.").
36 Geistfeld, supra note 16, at 413 (citations omitted).
37 See generally id.
38 Id.; O'Connell & Robinette, supra note 29.

&
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is low, with the majority of the public believing that the "[f]aws . .
make it too easy to sue." 39 Nonetheless, as long as health insurance in
the United States is unaffordable, much less universal, there will be
tremendous pressure on the tort system to play this compensation role.
Various torts scholars have expressed concern about-or even
contempt for-tort law's increased emphasis on facilitating
compensation for injuries. When Gary Schwartz attempted to reconcile
the roles of corrective justice and deterrence for tort law, he dismissed
the competing compensation-or loss-spreading-purposes in a
footnote, suggesting that tort law cannot be justified on such terms:
[The] negligence standard makes no sense if loss-spreading is
assumed to be a primary goal of the law: only a small fraction of all
injuries whose losses might be advantageously spread are caused by
the negligence of any third party (or any product defect).
Furthermore, the tort system's insistence on proof of elements such
as negligence and defect assures that the tort system will deliver
compensation only after substantial delays and considerable
contention. These features seem inconsistent with any loss
distribution rationale for tort law. 40

Similarly, Patrick Atiyah-coming from a very different perspectivehas condemned the use of tort law to achieve insurance-type
compensation goals. In his book, The Damages Lottery, 4 1 he attacked
the tort system's effectiveness in achieving any of these purposes and
suggests that the tort system be replaced with comprehensive insurance
systems. O'Connell and Robinette summarize his argument as follows:
Why, then, Atiyah asks, resort to the tort system that, with its huge
fortuities, delays, and transaction costs, makes a mockery of
insurance principles-when insurance is designed, after all, to
compensate for unmanageable losses with reasonable promptitude,
certainty, and efficiency?

39 Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "The Impact That It Has HadIs Between People 's
Ears:" Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs'Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 464
(2000). It is likely, however, that the public's overwhelmingly low opinion of the tort system
has been influenced by a concerted campaign from tort reform advocates. See generally id.;
Robert A. Kagan, How Much Do Conservative Tort Tales Matter?, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
711 (2006); F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the "Tort Reform " Movement,
35 HOFSTRAL. REV. 437 (2006).
40 Schwartz, supra note 26, at 1818 n.128. Quoted and discussed further in O'Connell
Robinette, supra note 29, at 146 n.58 ("We assume Schwartz uses the terms 'compensation'
and 'loss distribution' interchangeably. . . . [Elsewhere], Schwartz discusses tort law and
compensation in a more extensive and balanced way, while still rejecting 'loss spreading as
[a justification] . . .for tort law."' (citations omitted)).
41 PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE DAMAGES LOTTERY 189 (1997).
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Atiyah is so discouraged by the inadequacies of tort law as a
compensation device that he would not only abandon compensation
as a goal of tort law itself but would largely abandon all personal
injury law as well (except for instituting a no-fault scheme for auto
accidents). 42

These problems with the tort system, highlighted by Professors
Schwartz and Atiyah, make it a particularly poor vehicle for carrying
out a compensation-focused agenda.
II
INEFFICIENCIES AND INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE TORT SYSTEM

The gap between the theory and the practice looms large in torts and,
especially when coupled with complaints about the expense and
inefficiency of the tort system, prompts widespread dissatisfaction with
the tort system and with personal injury lawsuits in particular. These
problems with the system have been thoroughly documented elsewhere,
of course-particularly by advocates for the spate of tort reform
initiatives proposed and enacted in the various states in recent years. 4 3
For our purposes, however, the legitimate problems with the tort
system can be summarized in a few key bullet points:
*

The transaction costs of tort litigation are staggeringly high,
distorting outcomes.
o

Many victims of accidents get nothing for their injuries
because they cannot afford to bring suit against the person
or entity they blame for the harm. 44

42 O'Connell & Robinette, supra note 29, at 148 (citing ATIYAH, supra note 41, at 18689).
43 To be sure, the tort reform agenda has not focused on the larger purposes of the law
to hold tortfeasors accountable for their harmful conduct or to deter tortious behavior, or
even to provide more efficient and meaningful compensation to victims. The focus of most
such reforms has been just to limit liability in some form or another. Joseph A. Page,
Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 654 (1990) (reviewing PETER W. HUBER,
LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988)), quoted and discussed

in Davies, supra note 7, at 129.
44 Joe Palazzolo, We Won't See You in Court: The Era of Tort Lawsuits Is Waning,
WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2017 5:09 pm), https://www.wsj.com/articles/we-wont-see-you-in
-court-the-era-of-tort-lawsuits-is-waning-1500930572 [https://perma.cc/8C3U-T79P]; see
also DAVID M. ENGEL, THE MYTH OF THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY: WHY WE DON'T SUE

(2016) (setting forth a full range of reasons people don't sue, including but not limited to
the expense in time, energy, and money of bringing suit).
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o

Contingency fees, designed to improve access to justice,
help only those victims whose claims involve high dollar
amounts. 45

o

The cost and time it takes to go through a trial is so great
that the parties have powerful incentives to settle before
trial, and the compromise settlement is likely to give the
victim less than her full losses. 46

o

Even nonnegligent defendants, who are ultimately
exonerated of any tortious behavior, may be subjected to
crushing expenses in defending a suit. 47

o

Nonnegligent defendants may end up paying "nuisance"
settlements to avoid the cost of litigating, punishing the
innocent. 4 8

o

Such nuisance settlements may encourage even more
meritless claims as the system has the potential to enable
this type of extortion. 49

513

Compensation is incomplete.
o

Access to justice is difficult and expensive; accordingly,
many victims never file claims for their losses (or their full
losses) and go entirely uncompensated. 50

45 Plaintiffs' lawyers are insufficiently compensated unless the claim generates a
substantial economic recovery from which they can claim a percentage as their attorneys'
fees. Wronged and injured individuals whose losses are either too low, or not monetizable
(e.g., losses that are sentimental in nature-such as the companionship of a cherished pet
are typically uncompensated in our system, even though the damage done and the losses felt
by the victim may be very acute). See Palazzolo, supra note 44.
46 The time between filing a lawsuit and going through a trial can take months or even
years. Additionally, many states have capped noneconomic damages and medicalmalpractice recovery which in combination with increasing legal fees further incentivizes
parties to settle for a smaller amount or lawyers to turn away potential plaintiffs with small
claims. Id.
47 Total litigation costs, including attorney's fees for a defendant, can be as high as thirty
percent of the total compensation being demanded by the plaintiff. Joni Hersch & Kip
Viscusi, Tort Liability Litigation Costs for Commercial Claims, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
330, 331 (2007).
48 See Steven B. Hantler et al., Is the "Crisis" in the Civil Justice System Real or
Imagined?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1141 (2005).
49 It is hard to know, however, just how much "frivolous" litigation actually occurs. See
generallyLance P. McMillian, The Nuisance Settlement "Problem": The Elusive Truth and

a ClarifyingProposal, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 221 (2007).
50 Saks, supra note 9, at 1185, 1189. While the consumer litigation funding industry was
developed to alleviate some of the expenses associated with litigation and increase access
to the civil justice system, it comes with host of its own problems such as astronomically
high fees and interest rates that can often leave the vulnerable personal injury plaintiff owing
double or triple the advanced amount, ultimately eating away at any additional compensation
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o

Even in the rare case when the judgment gives the victim
full compensation for all her losses, her attorney keeps a
substantial share of it.5

o

This is a particular problem when the plaintiff is claiming
medical expenses she has already been billed; if one-third of
the medical expenses award goes to her attorney, she still
can't pay her medical bills.

o

As a practical matter, plaintiffs may need to seek extra
compensatory damages, for pain and suffering, emotional
distress, and loss of enjoyment of life, as well as punitive
damages in order to generate a large enough award to cover
the medical expenses after paying the contingent fee. 52

o

Court opinions sometimes consciously err on the side of
overcompensating the plaintiff, recognizing that a substantial
portion of the recovery will go to the lawyers. 53

Plaintiffs' pushing for these extra damages occasionally produce
an extraordinarily high recovery.
o

The odd high-recovery case can undermine
confidence that the system is fair and reasonable. 54

public

the plaintiff was able to get with the help of the funder in the first place. See Nicholas
Beydler, Risky Business: Examining Approaches to Regulating Consumer Litigation
Funding, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1159, 1159-60 (2012); see also Palazzolo, supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
51 Contingency fees are usually in the range of thirty to forty percent of whatever
compensation the plaintiff is awarded. See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of
the "Tort Reform "Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 453 (2006).

52 See Seffert, 364 P.2d at 345 (Traynor, J., dissenting) ("[A]wards for pain and suffering
serve to ease plaintiffs' discomfort and to pay for attorney fees for which plaintiffs are not
otherwise compensated."); see also Philip L. Merkel, Painand Suffering Damages at MidTwentieth Century: A Retrospective View of the Problem and the Legal Academy's First

Responses, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 545, 577 (2006) (citing Clarence Morris, Liabilityfor Pain
and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 476, 477 (1959) ("Morris acknowledged an argument of
personal injury lawyers that pain and suffering damages were used to pay the contingent fee
of the plaintiff's attorney, but he called the damages 'a clumsy substitute."')).
53 See, e.g., Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 68 (Cal. 1970) (justifying
the excess recovery that the collateral source rule generates on the ground that it "partially
serves to compensate for the attorney's share"); Patricia C. Bradford, Measuring Tort
Damagesfor Loss ofEarnings Without DeductingIncome Taxes: A Wisconsin Rule Which

Lost Its Rationale, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 210, 230 (1987) ("With respect to attorney's fees,
courts have reasoned that any overcompensation the plaintiff receives because the award for
lost earnings is not reduced by taxes is offset by the fact that the plaintiff does not receive
the entire award because he must pay his attorney.").
54 See, e.g., McMillian, supra note 49, at 228 (explaining that the accumulation of
anecdotes, such as the McDonald's hot coffee case, that on the surface appear to be injustices
develop a societal consciousness that America is a lawsuit-happy culture when in reality the
cases are usually much more nuanced).
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o

The occasional high-recovery case may cripple or bankrupt
a defendant, and even an entire industry. 55

o

The occasional high-recovery case may shock the insurance
industry and prompt premium increases that must be borne
by a wide cross-section of society who have never engaged
in tortious activity.5 6

Deterrence purposes are poorly served by the tort system as well.
o

The costs of judgments are typically born by the defendants'
insurers, not by the defendants themselves. 57

o

Products liability (and other forms of strict liability) burden
defendants who are not, in fact, negligent-e.g., innocent
sellers of products later shown to be defective are liable
under these laws in most states and will be left to carry the
full freight of liability, particularly if the manufacturer of
the defective product is insolvent or beyond the court's

jurisdiction.58
o

Negligence or strict liability is so easily found, in many
cases, that no one can assume that they can avoid liability
simply by exercising reasonable care; everyone must
anticipate, and insure against, legal liability. 59

55 See, e.g., Ben Berkowitz, Special Report: The Long, Lethal Shadow of Asbestos,
REUTERS (May 11, 2012 4:03 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-asbestos-lawsuits
/special-report-the-long-lethal-shadow-of-asbestos-idUSBRE84AOJ920120511

[https://

perma.cc/W3D7-KQ7N] ("By government estimates, about 100 companies have been
forced into bankruptcy proceedings because of asbestos liabilities including constructionmaterials and industrial heavyweights such as Johns Manville (now a part of Berkshire
Hathaway Inc), USG Corp and Owens Corning.").
56 Andrea Dickinson & Meg Sutton, The Ripple Effect of Social Inflation and Nuclear
Verdicts on the Insurance Industry, AMwINS (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.amwins.com
/resources-insights/article/the-ripple-effect-of-social-inflation-and-nuclear-verdicts-on-the
-insurance-industry [https://penna.cc/X754-LMUF] (describing how "nuclear verdicts"
have shaken the insurance industry); see, e.g., Dan Murray et al., Understandingthe Impact
of Nuclear Verdicts on the Trucking Industry, AM. TRANSP. RSCH. INST. 50 (June 2020),

https://truckingresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ATRI-Understanding-the-Impact
[https://perma.cc/MKP6
-of-Nuclear-Verdicts-on-the-Trucking-Industry-06-2020-3.pdf
-3BSA].

57

See Kenneth S. Abraham, Tort Luck and Liability Insurance, 70 RUTGERS UNIV. L.

REV. 1, 7-8 (2017) ("Even by my conservative calculation, liability insurance pays roughly
$165 billion, or 71%, of the $230 billion in annual tort liability costs.... The true figure is
probably closer to 80% or more.").
58 CONG. RSCH. SERV., SELECTED PRODUCTS LIABILITY ISSUES: A 50-STATE SURVEY

(2005), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20051013_RL32560_8c8ec5ee5b46f07a994
e3dcd6a979488a55b3dd5.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8S6-SJ5A].
59 This is especially true under vicarious liability doctrines such as respondeat superior
which makes employers legally responsible for wrongful acts of an employee or agent while
working within the scope of their employment or agency. As our modern society has made
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Learned Hand reasonableness isn't applied in medical
malpractice cases-doctors may be held liable for medical
decisions that are perfectly reasonable under Carroll
Towing;6 0 indeed, defensive medicine continually pushes
6
the medical-malpractice liability standard higher. 1

Of course, there has been a plethora of so-called "tort reform"
initiatives designed to remedy these failures of the tort system, or at
least to temper their impact. 62 But such initiatives-caps on pain and
suffering awards, caps on punitive damages, etc.-pushed by the
insurance industry and the business community respond to the
problems of the odd high-recovery case and have focused on limiting
recovery by the few tort victims who are actually getting significant
compensation for their injuries. 63 Needless to say, this type of reform
is not making the system more effective in any of its arguable purposes:
corrective justice, deterrence, or even victim compensation. Indeed,
most of the tort reform agenda acts not to "fix" the system or make it
more effective, but only to limit liability in some form or another; it is
both narrowly focused and transparently "fueled by the economic selfinterest of those who perceive themselves as adversely affected by the
tort system." 64

huge advances in information technology, the ability of one party to "police" the acts of
another makes it easier for plaintiffs to establish that an employer-employee or agency
relationship existed between the party and the actual tortfeasor they could have reasonably
policed. Rory Van Loo, The Revival of Respondeat Superior and Evolution of Gatekeeper
Liability, 109 GEO. L.J. 141, 156-59 (2020).
60 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1361.
61 Kenneth De Ville, Act Firstand Look Up the Law Afterward?: Medical Malpractice
and the Ethics of Defensive Medicine, 19 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 569, 578
(1998). Because the duty of care in medical malpractice cases is the type of care that a
reasonably competent and skilled health care professional, with a similar background and in
the same medical community, would have provided under the circumstances, medical
defendants can be expected to avoid liability (playing it safe) by giving a level of care that
meets or exceeds that standard. David Goguen, What Is the "MedicalStandardof Care " in
a Medical Malpractice Case?, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-the
-medical-standard-care-malpractice-case.html [https://penna.cc/E9FP-H6G2]. Given the
uncertainty of the ultimate determination, a rational actor (and even more so, a risk-averse
actor) would err on the side of giving a slightly higher standard of care than what they
perceive to be the applicable standard. But if most competent medical professionals are
exceeding that standard, it will only set a new standard at that higher level of care. And that
dynamic should be expected to exert continual upward pressure on the standard of care.
62 See CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM THE
STATES (2004), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/108th-congress-2003-2004/reports
/report_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7QY-RMB7].
63 See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 51, at 493.
64 Page, supra note 43, at 654.
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A. Costs of the US. Tort System vs. Costs in Other Countries
Economists have attempted to tally the cost of our tort system, both
to the individuals implicated in it, and to the economy and society as a
whole. Contrasting those figures with the cost of tort systems in other
countries makes a strong case that the U.S. system is far from ideal. 65
When compared with an array of European countries, for example,
[t]he U.S. has the highest liability costs as a percentage of GDP of
the countries surveyed, with liability costs at 2.6 times the average
level of the Eurozone economies . . . [and] four times higher than
those of the least costly European countries in our study - Belgium,
the Netherlands and Portugal. 6 6

There are many reasons tort liability may be lower in these countries,
including the fact that many of them rely far more heavily on
government regulation of industry to ensure safety. 67 In the American
politics, on the other hand, deregulation has long been a popular
concept heralded by President Ronald Reagan-and many in the
Republican leadership-since as a necessary condition for economic
growth. 6 8 And if the government does not regulate industry to ensure
safety, the tort system has a far more compelling role to play in placing

65 CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE ECONOMICS OF U.S. TORT LIABILITY: A PRIMER 20 n.5

(2003) ("[I]n 2000, tort costs equaled 1.9% of gross domestic product in the United States,
compared with 1.7% in Italy and 1.3% in Germany the next two closest countries."),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/108th-congress-2003 -2004/reports/10-22-tortrefonn
-study.pdf [https://penna.cc/M3KD-3A7Z]; cf Richard Posner, Is the Tort System Costing
the United States $865 Billion a Year?, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Apr. 1, 2007),

https://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2007/04/is-the-tort-system-costing-the-united-states
-865-billion-a-year posner.html [https://perma.cc/P8EJ-Z88D] (disputing the conclusions
of Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, and suggesting that the tort system may not be as costly as
claimed therein).
66 U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF
LITIGATION COSTS: CANADA, EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES 2 (2013), https://

instituteforlegalrefonn. com/wp-content/uploads/media/ILR_NERAStudyInternational
LiabilityCosts-update.pdf [https://penna.cc/2RGK-PD77] ("Features of the legal
environment in each country are highly correlated with litigation costs, implying that
changes to the liability system may have a substantial effect on costs. A common law (rather
than civil law) tradition and a high number of lawyers per capita are strong indicators of
higher litigation costs.").
67 See Elbert R. De Jong et al., Judge-Made Risk Regulation and Tort Law: An
Introduction, 9 EUR. J. RISK REG. 6, 6 (2018) for a discussion by European scholars of the
novelty of judge-made law, which ultimately regulates the conduct of people outside the
litigation. The suggestion is that there is a role for tort liability here because the government
has failed in its role as risk regulator. Id. at 7.
68 Will Kenton, Reaganomics, INVESTOPEDIA (May 25, 2021), https://www.investopedia
.com/terms/r/reaganomics.asp [https://penna.cc/GAD7-45NV].
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a check on industry practices that endanger the people and their
property. 69
It is worth noting as well, however, that each of the three nations
with the lowest tort costs-Belgium, Netherlands, and Portugal-has
an effective system of Universal Care, 70 which, as is argued below,
dramatically decreases the need to rely on the tort claims for healthcare
compensation, and therefore reduces demand for tort claims in the first
place.
B. Problems with Incentives in the Tort System
The data on costs are certainly disputable, as it is very difficult to
measure the full cost of a tort system. 7 1 We have no way of measuring,
for example, the cost to society of leaving tort victims uncompensated.72
And even if we could measure costs as to individual victims, it is
exceedingly difficult to figure out how many of victims there may be
or how much compensation they should be entitled to. 73 At the same
time, even those who do bring suit typically settle their cases
confidentially as an explicit term in the settlement agreement, so it is
difficult to determine whether reasonable compensation was ever
provided in those cases. 7 4 So what motivates tort victims to bring suit
69 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tort Law as a Regulatory System, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 54, 55
(1991).
70 The Portuguese and Belgian systems are publicly funded and available to everyone.
See Healthcarein Portugal, ALLIANZ CARE, https://www.allianzcare.com/en/support/health
-and-wellness/national-healthcare-systems/healthcare-in-portugal.html
[https://penna.cc
/Y5U4-CYJ7] Dominique Vandijck & Lieven Annemans, Belgian Healthcare: Overview of
the Health System and Financing, ICU MGMT., Winter 2009/10, at 37, https://health
management. org/c/it/issuearticle/belgian-healthcare-overview-of-the-health-system-and
-financing [https://penna.cc/4GJN-RQMT] ("The Belgian health system is based on the
principles of equal access and freedom of choice, with a Bismarckian-type of compulsory
national health insurance, which covers the whole population and has a very broad benefits
package."). The Dutch system still includes a role for private insurance and, like the
Affordable Care Act, mandates that everyone buy it through a heavily regulated health
insurance market. Dylan Scott, The Netherlands Has Universal Health Insurance - and
It's All Private, Vox (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/1/17
/21046874/netherlands-universal-health-insurance-private [https://perma.cc/47LR-W2YQ].
71 See, e.g., Press Release, Americans for Insurance Reform, Tillinghast's "Tort Cost"
Figures Vastly Overstate the Cost of the American Legal System (Jan. 6, 2004),
http://www.centerjd.org/air/pr/Tillinghast_Overstates.pdf [https://penna.cc/YA46-6C47].
72 For a compelling discussion of the cost of leaving tort victims un- or undercompensated, see Rick Swedloff, Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. STATE U. L. REV. 721,
727-34 (2012) (addressing the issue in the particular context of intentional torts).
73 In 2015, a study estimated that fewer than two in 1,000 alleged tort victims filed a
lawsuit. Palazzolo, supra note 44.
74 See McMillian, supra note 49, at 234-35.
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in the first place? The next few sections address this question and how
the often-conflicting incentives of other key players-defendants,
plaintiffs' bar, and insurance companies-may be problematic to a
plaintiff's recovery and the tort system as a whole.
1. Incentivesfor Victims
It stands to reason that victims of injuries, in a system where
health care is expensive and many people are either uninsured or
underinsured, will be highly motivated to sue in an effort to find some
way to pay their medical bills. 7 5 Professor Davies acknowledged "the
fact that uninsured Americans are forced by need to seek de facto health
coverage through the tort system when they are injured." 7 6 As The
Economist put it, "for millions of Americans, the legal system is also
their primary health insurer." 77 Therefore, even if the liability claim is
weak, and the defendants' negligence being doubtful or arguable, the
victim may feel compelled to give the tort system a try. 7 8 Faced with
staggering medical debt, victims may see a lawsuit as the best, or only,
hope of avoiding bankruptcy. 7 9
Some have suggested that the tort system fosters a "sweepstakes"
mentality, that plaintiffs are motivated by the potential to strike it rich

75 See Christopher J. Robinette, Harmonizing Wrongs and Compensation, 80 MD. L.
REV. 343, 345 (2021).
76 Davies, supra note 7, at 124.
?? Jeffrey O'Connell, Blending Reform of Tort Liability and Health Insurance: A
Necessary Mix, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1303, 1304 (1994) (quoting Sue the Rascals, THE
ECONOMIST (Feb. 13, 1993)).
78 Of course, attorneys working on a contingent fee basis are more reluctant to take a
weak case since they only get compensation contingent on winning. But as the amount in
controversy rises the litigation costs tend to rise at a slower rate so weaker cases with a
potential for a large recovery may sway reluctant attorneys to take the case. William H.J.
Hubbard, A Fresh Look at PlausibilityPleading, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 693, 711-12 (2016).
79 Lorie Konish, This is the Real Reason Most Americans Filefor Bankruptcy, CNBC
(Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/11/this-is-the-real-reason-most-americans
-file-for-bankruptcy.html [https://penna.cc/6KNV-6V76]; Kimberley Amadeo, Medical
Bankruptcy and the Economy, THE BALANCE (Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.thebalance.com
/medical-bankruptcy-statistics-4154729 [https://perma.cc/B3EK-KLF9]; but see Salvador
Rizzo, Sanders's Flawed Statistic: 500, 000 Medical Bankruptcies a Year, WASH. POST
(Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/08/28/sanderss-flawed
-statistic-medical-bankruptcies-year/ [https://perma.cc/DS4L-PK2J] (suggesting that, while
medical expenses may have contributed to hundreds of thousands of the bankruptcies in
America, there is evidence to suggest that they have caused only tens of the thousands
bankruptcies).

520

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100, 501

with a tort claim.8 0 The evidence suggests, however, that comparatively
few plaintiffs bring suit motivated by the desire to get rich.8 ' However,
their lawsuit may still be about money, motivated by a desire to recover
the expenses the accident has imposed on them and their need to cover
those expenses. In a Rand study, fifty-two percent of plaintiffs
surveyed about their reasons for suing said that rationale "I needed
someone else to pay me compensation because I had no other way to
cover all my expenses" was "very important." 8 2 As Mark Rothstein
observed, "Even though financial compensation is not the only reason
why injured patients sue, it is an important reason, and the need to pay
for future medical bills is a key element of the financial motivation. "83
The well-documented "endowment effect" in economics suggests
that people will place a much higher value on keeping what they have
than they will on acquiring something they have never had. 84 This
economic principle predicts the behavior of tort litigants: willing to sue
to avoid being stripped of their assets and standard of living by a tort
injury, but far less willing to resort to litigation to claim money they
have never owned, had claim to, or even dreamed of possessing. The
endowment effect suggests that disproportionately, tort plaintiffs will
sue to recover their losses far more often than they will sue for a chance
at any kind of windfall.8 5
2. Incentivesfor Defendants
The fear of liability creates incentives for defendants to take
precautions, including issuing warnings with posted signs and product
labeling. Strict adherence to a Learned Hand analysis would,
theoretically at least, lead to an optimal level of precaution-where the
expenditures on precaution are legally required only where the
80 See TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS,
DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS, AND GENDERED PARTIES 33-41 (2009).

81 Id. at 42-46.
82 DEBORAH R. HENSLER, ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE

UNITED STATES 171 (1991), cited in Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1350.
83 Mark A. Rothstein, Health Care Reform and Medical Malpractice Claims, 38 J.
LEGAL MED. ETHICS 871 (2010).

84 Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J.L. STUDIES 225
(1991).
85 There is considerable evidence as well that plaintiffs' primary motivations are not
financial at all. While both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys believe that plaintiffs'
primary incentive is financial, plaintiffs themselves speak of other motivations. RELIS, supra
note 80, at 44-46. They want a chance to be heard, moral vindication, acknowledgement
that they have been treated unjustly. Id. They want the defendant to admit responsibility and
apologize, and to deter similar events. Id
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precautions would yield benefits that outweigh their costs. 86 The
trends in tort law, however, have not been so limiting; liability is found,
and deep pockets are tapped, without strict adherence to Hand-type
balancing. 87 The inherent uncertainty that accompanies shifting
standards may lead to over-precaution-including the ceasing of
certain activities altogether-which is not only wasteful but highly
disruptive of economic activity.8 8 The costs of over-deterrence is not
easy to measure, but it may be considerable, as explained by Walter
Olson:
[S]ome of the costs of overdeterrence can be measured fairly directly,
if partially, and given monetary price tags of a sort.... Diverse
sources agree that hundreds of millions of dollars, if not more, are
spent on medical tests that have been ordered less to prevent
misdiagnosis than to stave off liability.... Many of the economic
values society sacrifices in pursuit of fuller liability are less easily
translated into cash terms: the enjoyment of rock faces and hiking
paths now put off limits to outdoor enthusiasts, the full usefulness in
expert hands of a machine hobbled by "idiot-proofing," the advice
value of a retired business leader who quits a hospital board for lack
of insurance. These costs do not show up as direct expenditures on
anyone's books but are just as real and in principle might be assigned
a price tag. 89

At times, the warnings and labels reach absurd proportions, which only
brings the tort system into further disrepute. 9 0 The fear of liability may
result in over-deterrence: the removal of playground equipment
(presumably the "fun" structures), the forbidding of children to run, and
even the closure of parks and swimming pools altogether-depriving

86 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (1947).
87 Schwartz, for example, explains how medical malpractice standards now in place
impose liability far more readily than Learned Hand's CarrollTowing opinion would justify.
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1361.
88 See generally Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards, 2 J.L. ECON & ORG. 279 (1986) (discussing how uncertainties surrounding legal
liability may result in wasteful overcompliance while noting how uncertainty may also result
in wasteful undercompliance; either way, uncertainty undermines efforts at creating efficient
incentives).
89 Walter Olson, Overdeterrence and the Problem of Comparative Risk, 37
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 42, 43 (1988).

90 See, e.g., George Will, Opinion, Litigation Nation, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2009), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/09/AR2009010902353.html
[https://penna.cc/MJ9P-8V9J] (reviewing PHILIP HOWARD, LIFE WITHOUT LAWYERS:
LIBERATING AMERICANS FROM TOO MUCH LAW (2009)) ("The warning label on a fiveinch fishing lure with a three-pronged hook 'Harmful if swallowed'; the label on a letter
opener says 'Safety goggle recommended."').

522

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100, 501

the public of any recreational use of such spaces and facilities. 9 1
Products liability exposure may deter companies from introducing
innovative products or prompt them to pull from the market existing
products that pose minimal risks of harm-the potential liability being
too great. 92 There may even be incentives to avoid testing products for
their safety;, as such testing is expensive, and if it shows any risk to
anyone, it may create liability even where lack of testing would not. 93
In many of these cases, society may suffer serious losses from the overdeterrence, including "defensive medicine," which has been estimated
to cost between $45 billion and $300 billion each year. 94 One lawsuit
has the potential to "spoil it for everyone," intimidating potential
defendants into withholding beneficial products and services from the
market (and from the public) altogether, lest they expose themselves to
potentially ruinous litigation. Senator Joe Lieberman explained this in
a Senate hearing on legislation related to products liability:
I have been approached again and again by businessmen and women,
particularly those from small businesses, who have told me that their
fear of product liability is affecting their willingness to put new
products on the market and, therefore diminishing their need to either
retain or hire new workers.... They tell me they fear not only the
cost of awards, but the cost of litigation, and the cost of insurance. 95

91 See, e.g., Dan Uhlinger, Towns' Worst Fears Realized: Suits Follow Playground
Mishaps, HARTFORD COURANT (Sept. 24, 1999), https://www.courant.com/news
[https://perma.cc/JV79-39D9];
/connecticut/hc-xpm-1999-09-24-9909240112-story.html
David Mattau, NJ Homeowner Associations Not Opening Pools for Fear of COVID
Lawsuits, N.J. 101.5 (May 6, 2021), https://nj1015.com/nj-homeowner-associations-not
-opening-pools-for-fear-of-covid-lawsuits/ [https://penna.cc/S7A5-34SA] (fear of legal
liability forces swimming pool closure during COVID-19 pandemic); Monmouth Beach
Condo Must Keep its Pool Closed Because of COVID-19 Liabilities,NEWS 12 N.J. (May 7,
2021), https://newjersey.news12.com/monmouth-beach-condo-must-keep-its-pool-closed
-because-of-covid-19-liabilities [https://perma.cc/FYF3-3UEM] (stating same).
92 Jtrgen O. Skoppek, The Market Consequences of Product Liability Litigation,
MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POL'Y (July 1, 1989), https://www.mackinac.org/6266 [https://

perma.cc/EY86-6BJ3].
93 Id.
94 Eric D. Katz, Defensive Medicine: A Case and Review of its Status and Possible
Solutions, W.J. EMERGENCY MED. (Sept. 9, 2019), https://westjem.com/cpc-em/defensive
-medicine-a-case-and-review-of-its-status-and-possible-solutions.html
[https://perma.cc
/256W-X8P3]; Thomas Sullivan, Defensive Medicine Adds $45 Billion to the Cost of
Healthcare,POL'Y AND MED. (May 5, 2018), https://www.policymed.com/2010/09/defensive
-medicine-adds-45-billion-to-the-cost-of-healthcare.html [https://penna.cc/83A5-CGTC].
95 Hearing on ProductLiability Laws and Their Impact on Small Business Innovation
and Competitiveness Before the S. Comm. on Small Bus., 102nd Cong. 1-2 (1991) (remarks
of Sen. Lieberman).
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He went on to note that the
perception . . . that product liability laws now act not as a rational
system to punish those who act irresponsibly, but as a kind of random
lottery of risk, regardless of fault. So those business people are
overreacting by withholding new and useful products from the
market and . . . abstaining from competing with foreign firms [not
subject to a comparable risk of liability]. 96

3. Incentives for the Plaintiffs'Bar
Contingency fees are generated as a function of the total recovery,
so there are great incentives to take high-dollar cases. As a matter of
simple math and self-interest, it is the amount and probability of the
potential recovery, rather than the egregiousness of the defendant's
conduct, that motivates a plaintiff's lawyer to take a personal injury
case.97
Cases with high medical bills are especially attractive because it is
hard to dispute such bills; it is easy to tell the defendant that you can't
settle for anything less than the medical expenses, and the defendant is
hard pressed to characterize such claims as "exaggerated" in any way.
Pain and suffering awards, and especially punitive damages awards, are
much harderto get: the jury must be persuaded, and it must feel either
great sympathy for the plaintiff or great indignation for the defendant. 98
Defendants are slow to offer much in settlement of such indeterminate
claims, especially if the medical expenses are low. 99 Not only is the
plaintiff far more likely to sue if she has substantial medical expenses
to pay, but she is far more likely to find an attorney willing to bring the
suit on her behalf. Lower medical expenses mean a lower recovery
96 Id. at 2.
97 Of course, highly egregious conduct has the potential to generate a high-dollar
recovery for a variety of reasons: (1) a defendant may be willing to settle quickly and
quietly and generously ratherthan suffer the reputational costs of having their egregious
conduct played out before a jury, and before the public at large; (2) a jury is far more likely
to return a verdict for the plaintiff and to err on the side of overcompensating (rather than
risk undercompensating) a plaintiff who has been victimized by a defendant's egregious
conduct; and (3) especially egregious conduct may give rise to punitive damages claims,
over and above any compensatory damages paid.
98 Brian H. Bornstein, From Compassion to Compensation: The Effect of Injury Severity
on Mock Jurors' Liability Judgments, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1477, 1477 (1998)
(" [M]ore severely hurt plaintiffs were more likely to obtain a favorable verdict, even though
evidence of liability was held constant. Greater severity [of injuries] influenced liability
judgments only insofar as it elicited positive feelings toward the plaintiff or negative feelings
toward the defendant.").
99 See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
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overall, and because that should reduce the lawyer's fee, lawyers are
more likely to decline such cases, and there will be less litigation
overall.
4. Incentivesfor Insurance Companies
Even if the insurance company knows it will have to pay eventually,
there may be compelling reasons for insurance companies to fight tort
settlements.10 0 They may benefit from the delay.' 0 ' They may benefit
from earning a reputation for hard bargaining: putting word out on the
street that plaintiffs' lawyers shouldn't expect a quick or a generous
settlement.' 0 2 These incentives make it difficult for plaintiffs to obtain
quick or reasonable settlements and necessarily drive up the attendant
transaction costs.
C. Systemic Failure of the Tort System
The upshot is that the U.S. tort system appears to do an
underwhelming job of serving its three putative purposes: (1) holding
wrongdoers accountable for the harm they cause, (2) deterring tortious
conduct, and (3) compensating victims of accidents.' 0 3 But the third
failure may be the most conspicuous-as pursuit of that third purpose
may be disruptive of the other two.
Anecdotal information suggests that some tort victims are
compensated quite handsomely-enough to alarm those who must pay
tort judgments and the public at large' 04-the tort system fails to

100 In Campbell v. State Farm, for example, the court heard evidence that State Farm
had adopted a performance, planning, and review (PP & R) policy designed to "meet
corporate fiscal goals by capping payouts on claims." Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1143 (Utah 2001), rev 'd sub nom, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). "[T]he evidence of its PP & R scheme demonstrates that
State Farm specifically calculated and planned to avoid full payment of claims, regardless
of their validity." Id. at 1149.
101 Jay M. Feinman, Incentives for Litigation or Settlement in Large Tort Cases:
Responding to Insurance Company Intransigence, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 189,
199 (2008) ("Even if an insurance company ultimately has to pay a judgment, there is a
financial advantage to delaying the payment and capturing the time value of the money. In
recent years companies have paid greater attention to the value of float and therefore have
greater incentive to delay or deny payment of large claims.").
102 Id. at 191-92 ("The [insurance] companies are likely to be hard bargainers, in order
to establish their reputation and to discourage easy claims.").
103 See generally ATIYAH, supra note 41.
104 A prime example is the infamous McDonald's hot coffee case. See William J. Chriss,
The External Aspect of Legal Ethics, Hot Coffee, and the Noble Lawyer: Attacks on the
Profession and Their Massive Ethical and Social Damage, 19 TRINITY L. REV. 13, 38-42
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generate full recoveries for the overwhelming majority of wrongfully
injured persons. 105 Michael Saks gives an example from the area of
medical malpractice:
[T]he study of California medical malpractice found that at most only
10% of negligently injured patients sought compensation for their
injuries. Even for those who suffered major, permanent injuries (the
group with the highest probability of seeking compensation) only one
in six filed. The earlier Health, Education, and Welfare study found
that only 6% of those negligently injured filed claims. The Harvard
Medical Practice Study found that in New York State "eight times as
many patients suffer an injury from medical negligence as there are
malpractice claims. Because only about half the claimants receive
compensation, there are about sixteen times as many patients who
suffer an injury from negligence as there are persons who receive
compensation through the tort system."1 06

Professor Paul Weiler makes similar observations in the context of
medical malpractice claims, which are equally applicable to all personal
injury claims:
Viewed as a form of insurance, the . . . regime has major flaws....
[T]ort benefits are doled out in a rather arbitrary manner to somebut not most-deserving victims, and also to those ... who are not
even "deserving" under tort law's fault-base frame of reference. Even
worse, to make payment to the relative handful ... who do surmount
the natural and legal barriers to demonstrating legal entitlement to
damages, the ... system must spend an inordinate amount of both
07
time ... and money ... litigating.1

Even the few who do bring suit, it appears, are unlikely to get sufficient
compensation to cover the medical expenses incurred as a result of their
injury. Saks concludes, "On average, awards undercompensate losses.
A recent study of medical malpractice awards found that each one
percent increase in loss resulted in an additional one-tenth to onetwentieth of a percent increase in award."' 0 8
(2013) (discussing the discrepancy between the media coverage of the McDonald's hot
coffee case and the reality).
105 See generally Saks, supra note 9.
106 Saks, supra note 9, at 1183-84 (citing HARVARD MED. PRAC. STUDY, PATIENTS,
DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT
COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK, 7-1 (1990); LEON S. POCINCKI ET AL., THE INCIDENCE OF
IATROGENIC INJURIES 50, 55 (1973); CAL. MED. ASS'N & CAL. HOSP. ASS'N, REPORT ON
THE MEDICAL INSURANCE FEASIBILITY STUDY 101 (Don H. Mills ed., 1977)).
107 Paul Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908, 915

(1993), quoted in O'Connell, supra note 77, at 1303.
108 Saks, supra note 9, at 1272 (citing Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability
in Medical MalpracticePayments: Is the Compensation Fair?,24 L. & SOC'Y REV. 997,
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But there can be no doubt that the prioritization of compensation in
the tort system has undermined the system's ability to pursue its other
legitimate objectives. The goals of corrective justice and deterrence are
inevitably sacrificed in a system that is trying to compensate injured
persons regardless of the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or
the need to deter the same. The result is to force comparatively innocent
(but deep-pocketed) persons to pay-despite their lack of wrongdoing
-and to deter a lot of non-tortious behavior, including productive
economic activity. We get less justice and less efficiency, all in pursuit
of compensation goals that the tort system is poorly equipped to serve.
Of course, if we found more effective, efficient, and comprehensive
methods of compensating victims, the tort system might be liberated to
focus on corrective justice and deterrence. And, as noted by Professor
Stephen Sugarman, we might experience less litigation if the United
States similarly provided compensation outside the tort system: "The
simple point here is that if tort were only to compensate for losses not
otherwise covered, and if those collateral sources grow, then tort would
recede.... [T]he adoption of comprehensive health insurance could
play a role here."10 9 The Economist enthusiastically endorsed that
outcome, noting that "the best way to slash the number of lawsuits
would be to fix America's dreadful health-care system."' 1O Thus, there
are compelling reasons to believe that Universal Care would, in terms
of both quality and quantity of claims, move the tort system's needle in
a positive direction.
III
INEFFICIENCIES AND INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

Health care and health insurance have become increasingly hot
topics in politics in the recent decades and even more so since the
Obama administration made it a priority in 2009. At the root of the
problem is the fact that health care has become so expensive in the
United States that few, if any, Americans can afford to meet their
healthcare needs without some type of health insurance, and the market
1019 (1990)). As discussed infra, at Section V.B.1, even if the plaintiff is awarded his full
losses, the attorneys' fees will cut into a large chunk of that.
109 Sugarman, supra note 20, at 2434-35.
110 O'Connell, supra note 77 (quoting THE ECONOMIST commenting that healthcare
reform, like tort reform, is "another example where more reason and less passion is sorely
needed"). But see id. at 1304-06 (disputing that expanding health insurance would decrease

tort filings).
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for health insurance has been no less dysfunctional than the market for
health care.' As a result, a rising number of Americans are becoming
saddled with crippling medical debt." 2 Those who can find a way to
blame others for their medical problems will find powerful incentives
to resort to the tort system as a way out of this dilemma," 3 even for
long-shot, high-dollar cases that strain and stretch the principles of
liability." 4 Accordingly, these problems with healthcare costs indicate
that the primary source of this crisis is not the failure of the tort system
itself, but rather the failure of the healthcare system (or the health
insurance system)-more specifically, its failure to make health care
affordable and accessible to those who need it.
A. Market Failurein the HealthcareMarket
The market for health care is curiously unaffected by many of the
free-market forces (e.g., price competition) that might otherwise
provide a check on rising costs. Consumers of health care are rarely
given the opportunity to make meaningful choices about what care they
are willing to pay for or even what it will ultimately cost: the medical
services are ordered by the doctor, and the patient typically submits to
those services with no idea of what the costs will be." 5 The plaintiff
then is surprised by the bill later on." 6

III See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, Those IndecipherableMedical Bills? They're One
Reason Health Care Costs So Much, N.Y. TIMES: MAGAZINE (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/magazine/those-indecipherable-medical-bills-theyre-one-reason
-health-care-costs-so-much.html
[https://penna.cc/DJ72-ZGBE] (noting that factors
contributing to high healthcare costs include runaway drug prices, excessive testing, and
sky-high charges for the most basic medical interventions); CHRIS POPE, MANHATTAN
INST., CONTINUOUS RENEWABLE COVERAGE: RX FOR AMERICA'S DYSFUNCTIONAL

HEALTH-INSURANCE SYSTEM 5-6 (2020), https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites
/default/files/rx-americas-dysfunctional-health-insurance-system-CP.pdf
[https://penna.cc
/8YQJ-R34E] (detailing the dysfunction of the health insurance market).
112 Krysten Crawford, America's Medical Debt Is Much Worse than We Think, STAN.
INST. FOR ECON. POL'Y RSCH. (July 20, 2021), https://siepr.stanford.edu/news/americas
-medical-debt-much-worse-we-think [https://penna.cc/JU4Q-M2VK].
113 Davies, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
114 Hubbard, supra note 78, at 712 (explaining why it may make rational economic sense
to file long shot or "implausible" cases, if the stakes are high enough).
115 See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 111 (discussing how the complex system of billing
and coding medical providers use to charge for services enables "sky-high" charges for basic
medical care while also keeping patients in the dark on the itemized costs of those services);
but see infra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
116 Rosenthal, supra note 111.
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A related issue is the patient's inability to engage in comparison
shopping and gravitate to lower-cost providers. A true free market
would involve price competition between healthcare providers which,
in turn, would put downward pressure on healthcare pricing as
providers competed for patients." 7 In actuality, patients have little
choice or information on which they might base such a choice." 8 Most
individuals have a take-it-or-leave-it option to obtain the health
insurance provided by their employer.11 9 Once they "take it," they are
stuck with whatever doctors and other healthcare providers are in the
insurance company's network.120 This puts patients in a position where
they are utterly without bargaining power. Unless their insurance
company flexes its muscles to bring down costs, patients are almost
entirely vulnerable to the exploitative pricing of a monopolist.
In order to help address this problem, the Trump administration
launched a 2019 initiative aimed at "improving price and quality
transparency in American healthcare."' 2 ' This long-overdue effort
acknowledged the severity of the problem and, as it is phased in over
the next several years, may help restore some elements of a functional
marketplace to the healthcare system.' 2 2 The industry has resisted
those reforms, however, and it remains to be seen how effective the
price transparency initiative will be in correcting the market failure.' 2 3
117 Chris Seabury, The Cost ofFree Markets, INVESTOPEDIA (June 24, 2021), https://
www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/free-market-regulation.asp [https://perma.cc
/C22N-95W3] ("Supply and demand create competition, which helps ensure that the best
goods or services are provided to consumers at a lower price.").
118 See, e.g., Helaine Olen, Opinion, Choosinga HealthInsurancePlan Is Not 'Shopping,'
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/02/opinion/health-insurance
-shopping-obamacare.html?searchResultPosition=2 [https://penna.cc/9LCP-FCFV] ("Only
9 percent of Americans can properly define all four of these vital phrases: health care
premium, health plan deductible, out-of-pocket maximum and coinsurance .... ").
119 See KAISER FAM. FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS ANNUAL SURVEY 75
(2019).
120 See id. at 217.
121 Under Executive Order 13877 (2019), which called for improving price and quality
transparency in American healthcare to put patients first, the Department of Health
Human Services, Department of Labor, and Department of the Treasury collectively issued
and proposed rules on "transparency in coverage" which in part require hospitals to provide
patients with information about the hospital's "standard charges" for over 500 shoppable
services. It will be implemented over a four-year period. See 85 Fed. Reg. 72,158 (Nov. 12,

2020).
122 Hospitals Have Started Posting Their Prices Online. Here's How Consumers Will
Benefit, NPR (July 16, 2021, 5:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/07/16/1016747500

/hospitals-have-started-posting-their-prices-online-heres-how-consumers-will-bene [https://
perma.cc/WFV7-5BP7].
123 Id.
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But it should be clear that markets (competitive or otherwise) did not
correct this problem; this was a market failure that required a regulatory
response.
At the same time, hospitals are not permitted to reject patients from
their emergency rooms on the basis of ability to pay.' 2 4 Those who are
impoverished and uninsured are treated, and the bills are written off as
uncollectible, leaving the hospital to either take the hit or recoup the
losses from other sources.' 2 5 This rule obviously distorts the market so
that prices do not actually reflect the marginal cost of the service,
frustrating the efficiency that might otherwise have been achieved by a
market equilibrium.
Finally, even if patients did have sufficient information to comparison
shop and make meaningful price-based choices about their health care,
the market is disrupted by the extreme inelasticity of demand for
critical medical services.1 2 6 Anytime the healthcare decision is a matter
of life or death, of course, the decision is likely to be a foregone
conclusion-regardless of the price of the service. Desperate buyers

124 Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C.

§

1395dd

(1988); Uninsured and Facing an Emergency? Know Your Rights!, PATIENT ADVOC.

FOUND., https://www.patientadvocate.org/explore-our-resources/preventing-medical-debt
[https://penna.cc/2E2E-M2RT].
/uninsured-and-facing-an-emergency-know-your-rights/
This rule is driven by ethical and humanitarian concerns rather than economic efficiency
concerns, and it is highly disruptive of the market forces that might otherwise promote
efficient market-based solutions. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-747,
EMERGENCY CARE: EMTALA IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES 1 & 11 (2001).
125 See Craig Garthwaite et al., Hospitals as Insurers ofLast Resort, 10 AM. ECON. J. 1
(2018) (concluding that increases in the uninsured population correlates with lower hospital
profit margins). See also William C. Hsiao, How to Fix American Health Care: What Other
Countries Can-And Can't-Teach the United States, FOREIGN AFFS., Jan.-Feb. 2020, at

96, 99 (explaining when one insurance plan negotiates lower prices for services, the provider
can charge another insurance plan higher prices to make up the difference resulting in
varying prices of the same service by more than 300 percent). Ironically, the uninsured pay
much higher rates than the insured because insurance companies can negotiate special rates
for those on their plans. Even for those medical services not covered by insurance (e.g.,
deductibles), the insured pay less than the uninsured. See Kevin Lucia et al., Balance
Billing by Health Care Providers: Assessing Consumer ProtectionsAcross States, THE

COMMONWEALTH FUND (June 13, 2017), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications
/issue-briefs/2017/jun/balance-billing-health-care-providers-assessing-consumer
[https://
perma.cc/D4XX-8UZV].
126 JEANNE S. RINGEL ET AL., RAND, THE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE

xi (2002), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph reports/2005/MR1355
.pdf [https://perma.cc/C252-8ZKJ]; see generally Randall P. Ellis et al., Health Care
Demand Elasticitiesby Type ofService, 55 J. HEALTH ECON. 232 (2017).
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who have no opportunity to comparison shop are vulnerable to
exploitative pricing by the healthcare industry.'
For all of these reasons, private, market-based solutions in the health
care market are unlikely to produce effective or efficient outcomes.
Even the fiercest defenders of private competitive markets recognize
that, in cases of market failure, government intervention is
warranted.128 We see it in the case of natural monopolies, such as
utilities, which prompt every state in the union to have a system of
regulating utility rates.1 2 9 We also see it in the case of public goods,
such as national defense, where the free-rider problem would otherwise
frustrate any market-based equilibrium.' 30 Therefore, the government
typically provides the service in these industries and compels everyone
to pay for it through taxes.131
It is not surprising that the failure of the healthcare market is
prompting similar calls for government intervention. Many believe the
time has come for the government to provide (or to ensure the provision
of) medical care and require everyone to pay for it, just as they do for
national defense, local fire prevention, policing, libraries, public
schools, etc.1 32 If the market fails to provide something so critical to
human life in a way that makes it accessible to everyone, alternatives
need to be considered.
As discussed below, government intervention in the market for
health care may serve not only to keep prices low but to keep costs low
as well. This is a lesson we have learned from other countries that have
ventured into truly Universal Care, as well as from our own experience
with Medicare.133

127 See Glenn Melnick, Opinion, Blame Emergency Rooms for the Out-of-Control Cost
ofHealth Care, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion
/emergency-rooms-cost-insurance.html [https://penna.cc/356T-D8R4].
128 Sean Ross, How Is a Market Failure Corrected?, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 18,
2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/042115/how-market-failure-corrected. asp
[https://penna.cc/K4GW-XZRY] ("Market failures can be corrected through government
intervention, such as new laws or taxes, tariffs, subsidies, and trade restrictions.").
129 See generally Travis Kavulla, There Is No Free Marketfor Electricity: Can There
Ever Be?, 1 AM. AFFS. 126 (2017) (explaining the development of utility regulation).
130 See Richard M. Ebeling, NationalDefense and the FundamentalProblem with "Public
Goods," FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://fee.org/articles/national-defense
-and-the-fundamental-problem-with-public-goods/ [https://penna.cc/Q5WD-HYHN].
131 Id.
132 See, e.g., Amy Alspaugh et al., UniversalHealth Carefor the United States: A Primer
for Health Care Providers, 66 J. MIDWIFERY & WOMEN'S HEALTH 441 (2021).
133 See discussion infra Section III.B.
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B. Costs of the U.S. Healthcare System vs. Costs in Other Countries
A multiplicity of factors-including, inter alia, the lack of a
functional market to keep prices low and the pressures to engage in
defensive medicine (arguably driven by the tort system)-have driven
the cost of medical care up at rates far beyond that of general inflation
rates,1 34 and far beyond the cost of medical care in other countries.1 35
In December 2019, the Health Care Cost Institute published a
comparison of healthcare costs in various highly developed nations that
demonstrated, in a compelling series of charts, how the U.S. costs were
the highest by far.1 36 There are compelling reasons to believe that this

134 Kimberly Amadeo, The Rising Cost of Health Care by Year and Its Causes, THE
BALANCE (Mar. 27, 2021), https://www.thebalance.com/causes-of-rising-healthcare-costs
-4064878. See also Diane Archer, Health Care Costs Continue to Rise Fasterthan Inflation,

JUST CARE (Dec. 11, 2019), https://justcareusa.org/health-care-costs-continue-to-rise-faster
-than-inflation/#:-:text=Axios%20reports%20that%20in%202 018,in%20utilization%2C
%20fueled%20the%20increase [https://penna.cc/8BT7-T76H] ("[H]igher prices, not an
increase in utilization, fueled the increase [of over 4% per year in healthcare spending in
2017 and 2018]."); Fred Pace, Health Care Costs Continue to Rise Faster than Wages,

Inflation, HERALD-DISPATCH (Dec. 29, 2019), https://www.herald-dispatch.com/news/health
-care-costs-continue-to-rise-faster-than-wages-inflation/article_b 3bb940-5253 -5564-9c2b
-9c99e256a54b.html [https://penna.cc/7D3Z-7BXZ]; New Analysis of Large Employer
Health Coverage: The Cost to Familiesfor Health Coverage and Care Has Risen More
than 2X Faster than Wages and 3X Faster than Inflation over the Last Decade,

KFF (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/press-release/new-analysis-of-large
-employer-health-coverage-the-cost-to-families-for-health-coverage-and-care-has-risen-more
-than-2x-faster-than-wages-and-3x-faster-than-inflation-over-the-last-decade/ [https://perma
.cc/QS9T-4SKV].
135 In 2019, health spending per person in the United States was $10,966 forty-two
percent higher than Switzerland, the country with the next highest per capita health
spending. Emma Wager et al., How Does Health Spending in the U.S. Compare to Other
Countries?, HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Jan. 21, 2022), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org
/chart-collection/health-spending-u-s-compare-countries/#item-start
[https://penna.cc
/3FXT-PX48].
136 John Hargraves & Aaron Bloschichak, International Comparisons of Health Care
Pricesfrom the 2017 iFHPSurvey, HEALTH CARE COST INSTITUTE (Dec. 17, 2019), https://

healthcostinstitute.org/in-the-news/international-comparisons-of-health-care-prices-2017
-ifhp-survey [https://penna.cc/J2JQ-U8C5]. Follow the link for a color version of the chart
on the following page. Even in black and white, however, it is clear that the USA dots
(all at 100%) are far higher than in other countries (with the exception of angiograms and
cataract surgery in New Zealand).
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is not a simple case of "you get what you pay for." First, medical
outcomes are at least as good in a variety of countries with significantly
lower medical expenditures. Richard Knox, an expert on the German
healthcare system, contrasted it with the U.S. system as follows:
Nobody can accuse Germany of stinting on care or technology. As
the new analysis found, Germany still has more doctors and nurses
per capita than we do, about the same number of MRI and CT
machines and considerably more hospital beds. Yet it spends half of
what the U.S. does on health care per capita, and bests us on measures
of population health such as life expectancy, infant mortality and
maternal mortality.

Nobody seriously thinks one nation's system could be imposed on
any other's. Still, these international comparisons make the
instructive point that America's fiercely defended reality is not the
only way to provide for citizens' health-care needs. But it is certainly
the most expensive way.1 37

In 2018, the United States spent more on health care as a share of the
economy (16.9% of its GDP) than any other OECD country13 8 and

Id.
137 Richard Knox, Why Are U.S. Health Costs the World's Highest? Study Affirms 'It's
The Prices, Stupid,' WBUR (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.wbur.org/news/2018/03/13/us
-health-costs-high-jha [https://perma.cc/NNK3 -4B2Q].
138 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an
international organization, with 38 member countries-including the most highly developed
countries in the West-who work together to promote effective policies and find "solutions
to a range of social, economic and environmental challenges." About, OECD, https://
www.oecd.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2022) [https://perma.cc/LL8R-WBZK].
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almost twice as much as the average OECD country.1 3 9 "Despite the
highest spending, Americans experience worse health outcomes than
their international peers. For example, life expectancy at birth in the
U.S. was 78.6 years in 2017-more than two years lower than the
OECD average and five years lower than Switzerland, which has the
longest lifespan."1 4 0 Infant mortality rates in 2019 were higher in the
United States than in more than fifty other countries.141 Maternal
mortality rates in 2017 were higher in the United States than in more
than sixty other countries and, unlike most of the rest of the world, have
been rising dramatically since 2000 (from twelve to nineteen maternal
deaths per 100,000 live births).1 4 2
The dramatic growth of the medical tourism industry is a testament
to the fact that American patients feel that they can get adequate health
care in other countries,1 4 3 and that the cost of the same procedures in
the United States are expensive enough to justify the cost of the
international travel in order to get access to more affordable healthcare
markets. 144
Second, the high quality of the healthcare services provided in the
United States does nothing for the significant subset of Americans who
cannot afford it in the first place.1 45 If only the insured have access to
139 Roosa Tikkanen & Melinda K. Abrams, U.S. Health Carefrom a GlobalPerspective,
2019: Higher Spending, Worse Outcomes?, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2020/jan/us-health-care
-global-perspective-2019#4 [https://perma.cc/BEJ7-HJ8N].
140 Id.

141 See Mortality Rate, Infant (per 1000 Live Births), THE WORLD BANK, https://data
.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN [https://penna.cc/X2DP-XMU3].
142 Compare MaternalMortality Ratio (Modeled Estimate, per 100,000 Live Births),
THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT, and Maternal
Mortality Ratio (Modeled Estimate, per 100,000 Live Births)-United States, THE WORLD
HEALTH BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT?locations=US [https://
perma.cc/B4DN-LVAK].
143 Medical Tourism Global Market Report 2021: COVID-19 Impacts, Growth and
Change to 2030, BUSINESSWIRE (Jun 8, 2021, 10:57 AM), https://www.businesswire.com
/news/home/20210608005855/en/Medical-Tourism-Global-Market-Report-202 1 -COVID
-19-Impacts-Growth-and-Change-to-2030---ResearchAndMarkets.com
[https://perma.cc
/4KL2-CQF5].
144 The same procedures may be forty to ninety percent less expensive in other countries
versus the United States. Sandra K. Cesario, Implications ofMedical Tourism, 22 NURSING
FOR WOMEN'S HEALTH 269, 270 (2018).

145 See generally Aaron E. Carroll & Austin Frakt, The Best Health Care System in the
World: Which One Would You Pick?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/interactive/2017/09/18/upshot/best-health-care-system-country-bracket.html [https://
perma.cc/YC95-EESJ].
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it, a healthcare system can hardly be praised as the best system of health
care, no matter the quality of care provided to the few who can afford
it.1 4 6 For those who have no access to it, or whose access subjects them
to crushing debt, it may be no better than no system at all. Indeed, a
system that provided them with minimally adequate health care would
be far superior, at least from the perspective of the "have nots." 147
In other words, the divide between the "haves" and the "have nots"
in the United States is depicted in particularly stark terms by the
problem of health care.14 8 The "haves" continue to have access to very
high-quality care and to benefit from a system that fosters innovation;
they are sufficiently empowered to ensure that the system that serves
them continues to do so.1 4 9 The same is true of those who profit from
the status quo: the pharmaceutical industry, health insurers, doctors,
and for-profit hospitals.15 0 Members of Congress, and many of their
biggest donors, are therefore heavily invested in the status quo and
actively resistant to any system that might compromise the present
system for the benefit of the disempowered in society.' 5
C. Problems with Incentives in the HealthcareSystem
The high cost of medical care, which is rising at a far higher rate
than inflation,' 5 2 generates a host of difficulties. Soaring costs of health
insurance force rational actors who enjoy comparatively good health to
forgo the insurance: they are unlikely to need the insurance, and

146

147

Id.
And the "have nots" were estimated to be around 30 million in 2019. CONG. BUDGET

OFF., WHO WENT WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE IN 2019, AND WHY? (2020), https://

[https://penna.cc/W28Q
www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-09/56504-Health-Insurance.pdf
-JPWU].
148 Lenny Bernstein & Laurie McGinley, An Army ofDoctors. Access to an Experimental
Drug. A Special Patient Gets Special Care., WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2020), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/health/an-army-of-doctors-access-to-an-experimental-drug-a-special
-patient-gets-special-care/2020/10/03/ba3ele32-05b0-1leb-897d-3a6201d6643f_story.html
[https://perma.cc/Q9D7-3NJ3] ("VIP treatment is a feature of American medicine. Major
hospitals throughout the country have private spaces for celebrities, the super-rich and the
influential, patients who want to be shielded from the public and just may make a large
donation if they are happy with their care.").
149 Id. The complaint that universal care will result in "lower quality" care is a concern
only for those few who are currently enjoying a very high quality of care, and only if the
new universal care would be set up in a way that deprived them of the opportunity to pay a
premium for better care.
150 See Davies, supra note 7, at 154.
151 Id. at 126-27.
152 See supra note 134.
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therefore its expected value-for them-is less than the price.1 53
Consumers with serious chronic conditions, on the other hand, will find
the insurance to be worthwhile because their anticipated outlay for
health services likely exceeds the cost of the insurance. The resulting
dynamic has been termed the "death spiral" 5 4 because, as healthier
people drop their coverage, the insurance companies must raise rates
even more to compensate for the fact that only those with high health
care needs (or who are likely to need expensive care) are buying
insurance.' 5 5 The newly raised rates, of course, only prompt even more
people-again, the healthiest ones-to drop the coverage.
Before the Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), of course, insurance
companies could simply refuse to insure those with chronic or
preexisting conditions. Insurance companies could keep rates down by
insuring only the healthiest people and those least likely to need care.
But that left the people with the greatest need for medical insurance not
only uninsured but also uninsurable. The ACA addressed this problem
by prohibiting insurance companies from refusing to cover people with
preexisting conditions and addressed the "death spiral" problem by
requiring everyone to buy health insurance-a requirement known as
the "individual mandate."1 56 Under the ADA, as originally passed,
failure to buy insurance brought a monetary penalty.' 5 7
The individual mandate was politically controversial and became the
focus of lawsuits aimed, unsuccessfully, at invalidating the ACA.1 5 8 In
2017, Congress voted to eliminate the penalty for failure to buy health
insurance,1 5 9 opening the door to a new "death spiral." And, indeed,
153 "Expected value" is a term of art in economics, derived by multiplying the probability
of an outcome by the value of the outcome. Will Kenton, Expected Value (EV),
INVESTOPEDIA (June 27, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/tenns/e/expected-value.asp
[https://perma.cc/447Q-X6JM]. A ten percent chance of winning a $200 lottery has an
expected value of $20. Similarly, a health insurance benefit has a very low expected value
to a comparatively healthy person who has a very low probability of needing that health
care.
154 Jon Gabel & Heidi Whitmore, The Marketplace Premiums Increase: Underwriting
Cycle or Death Spiral?, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org
/do/10.1377/hblog20170208.058341/full/ [https://penna.cc/7TBG-LZGJ].
155 See Michael Geruso & Timothy J. Layton, Selection in Health Insurance Markets
and Its Policy Remedies, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 23 (Fall 2017).
156 Summary ofthe Affordable CareAct, KFF (Apr. 25, 2013), https://www.kff.org/health
-reform/fact-sheet/summary-of-the-affordable-care-act/ [https://penna.cc/J3KW-3GGY].
157 Id.
158 E.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
159 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, passed in December 2017, eliminated the individual
mandate penalty effective January 1, 2019. See Christine Eibner & Sarah Nowak, The Effect
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the number of uninsured Americans has increased since 2017 (after a
dramatic drop when the ACA was first implemented),1 60 as
comparatively healthy individuals can opt out of health insurance
without penalty.
IV
THE PROMISE OF UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE

The ACA compromise has certainly failed to garner widespread
support across the United States,' 1 6 as it has fallen well short of its goal
of ensuring health care for everyone,' 6 2 and as the Republican
establishment has worked hard to stoke resentment against it. 163
Despite the fact that many of the ACA's provisions, including those
protecting people with preexisting conditions, are enormously popular
among Americans across the political spectrum, the legislation overall
is far less popular.1 64 And its future is dubious at best; with the
individual mandate penalty repealed, and with the protection for people
with preexisting conditions in place, it will be hard to avoid a "death
spiral."1 65
But good fixes for this problem are hard to come by.1 6 6 Even in
the late 2010s, when both houses of Congress, as well as the White
House, were in Republican hands, Republicans who had campaigned
against the ACA-and had promised to "repeal and replace" it-were
of Eliminating the Individual Mandate Penalty and the Role of Behavioral Factors,
THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (July 11, 2018), https://www.commonwealthfund.org

/publications/fund-reports/20 1 8/jul/eliminating-individual-mandate-penalty-behavioral
-factors [https://penna.cc/5KMV-3LJ2].
160 Tolbert et al., supra note 12.
161 Liz Hamel, et al., 5 ChartsAbout Public Opinion on the Affordable Care Act and the
Supreme Court, KFF (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/5

-charts-about-public-opinion-on-the-affordable-care-act-and-the-supreme-court/
perma.cc/79GY-DXHL].

[https://

162 The percentage of uninsured non-elderly Americans never fell below ten percent.
Tolbert et al., supra note 12.
163 Tom Cohen, GOP Seeks a Groundswell of Opposition to Obamacare, CNN (Nov.
21, 2013), https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/21/politics/obamacare-gop-snowball/index.html
[https://perma.cc/FD5T-G5LJ].
164 Hamel et al., supra note 161.
165 See Gabel & Whitmore, supra note 154 and accompanying text.
166 Oren Cass, RepublicanPartyBattles Over Its Post-TrumpianSoul, FIN. TIMES (Sept.
3, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/824983ed-2a99-4c3a-a6ad-c05f54d48239
[https://
perma.cc/7B6W-BQC7] ("Republicans brought together libertarians and conservatives who
both prized markets but in different ways. Libertarians regard the free market as an end unto
itself, or trust that the free market will deliver the best outcome. Conservatives see the free
market as a means to an end.").
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hamstrung by the fact that they had no consensus on what they should
replace it with.1 67 It wasn't just that the White House and the
conservative critics of the ACA were unable to implement their
healthcare reform proposals; they were unable to come up with any
practically (or politically) viable proposals whatsoever.1 68 The
problems with U.S. health care are exceedingly complex and not
amenable to simple or straightforward resolution,1 69 especially not by
any approach compatible with small government, deregulating the
industry, or "keeping the government's hands off your health care."1 70
And the ACA, a compromise approach designed to keep health care in
private hands, has failed to solve the persistent problems in that
system.171
A. What UniversalCare Might Look Like
The general discontent with the ACA-fierce opposition from the
right (except for the preexisting condition protections) and
ambivalence from the left-has fueled calls for further reform. As the
right has failed to produce a viable alternative, the left is now touting
Universal Care, most often in the form of a government-administered,
single-payer plan. This idea is not a new one. Various versions of
Universal Care have been proposed over the years, including proposals

167

Julie Rovner, 5 Reasons Why GOP's Repeal andReplace ' Didn't Work, HEALTHCARE

(Jul. 19, 2017), https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/5-reasons-why
-gops-repeal-and-replace-didnt-work [https://perma.cc/88CB-N3YB].
168 Id.
169 Id. President Trump expressed his own surprise at the complexity of the problem,
asserting that "nobody knew that health care could be so complicated." (emphasis added)
Kevin Liptak, Trump: 'Nobody Knew Health Care Could Be So Complicated,' CNN (Feb.
28, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/27/politics/trump-health-care-complicated/index
.html [https://penna.cc/25SS-ECFJ].
170 Americans' Views ofGovernment: Low Trust, but Some Positive PerformanceRatings,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020
/09/14/americans-views-of-government-low-trust-but-some-positive-performance-ratings/
[https://perma.cc/LMK6-NJU2] (noting the low level of trust in government but
acknowledging that healthcare could be an exception); see also TPM TV, Obama Pokes Fun
at Don't Touch My Medicare 'People, YOUTUBE (Jul. 28, 2009), https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=pJp-roulVsA [https://penna.cc/J58M-TDPX] (President Obama's reaction to
someone who objected to government run healthcare but nonetheless supported Medicare).
171 It is worth noting that the Dutch system of Universal Care does include a role for
private insurers. Dylan Scott, The Netherlands Has Universal Health Insurance-And
It's All Private, Vox (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/1/17
/21046874/netherlands-universal-health-insurance-private [https://penna.cc/PR4S-YQMA].
See infra note 177 for more about the Dutch system.
FINANCE
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from Senator Edward Kennedy in the 1970s,172 and proposals from the
Clinton administration in the 1990s.17 3 At the same time, less-universal
proposals have been enacted to afford government-funded health care
to older Americans (Medicare), low-income Americans (Medicaid),
and veterans (Veterans Health Administration, or VHA).' 7 4 Medicare
and Medicaid-the former being available to participants over a certain
age, and the latter to low-income participants-enjoy high levels of
public support on both sides of the political aisle.' 7 5
Looking at other countries, we see a variety of approaches to
Universal Care in addition to systems where the health care is provided
directly by government employees (e.g., India).1 7 6 Most involve some
type of regional control, with centrally collected tax money given in
block grants or distributed to regional governments for implementation
(e.g., Canada, Denmark),1 7 7 and others that retain a role for private

172 Barry R. Furrow, Health Reform and Ted Kennedy: The Art of Politics and
Persistence, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 445, 459-64 (2011).
173 Davies, supra note 7, at 125-30.
174 Medicare, enacted in 1965, is a national health insurance plan that provides care for
people over the age of sixty-five. It has been expanded to include younger people who are
disabled as defined by the Social Security Administration, as well as people suffering the
end stages of several enumerated diseases (e.g., ALS, or Lou Gehrig's disease). See JAY E.
GRENIG & NATHAN A. FISHBACH, METHODS OF PRACTICE

§

30:30 (5th ed. 2020), Westlaw

(database updated Oct. 2021). The VHA is part of the federal government. Its hospitals and
clinics are owned and operated by the federal government. Doctors, administrators, medical
staff, and nonmedical support staff are all federal employees. Veterans are entitled to receive
medical care at these facilities without paying any premiums or facing any deductibles
although they may be required to make modest copayments. 2022 VA HealthcareCopay
Rates, VA, https://www.va.gov/health-care/copay-rates/ (last updated Dec. 23, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/9B77-RDNE]. In addition to these federal initiatives, some states have
targeted healthcare programs, such as California's "Medi-Cal" program which affords
medical benefits to Californians whose income places them up to 138% of the federal
poverty level. Medi-Cal Categories, DISABILITY BENEFITS 101, https://ca.dblOl.org/ca
/programs/health coverage/medical/program2a.htm [https://penna.cc/TM69-RTEB].
175 Dan Mangan, Medicare, MedicaidPopularityHigh: Kaiser, CNBC (July 17, 2015),
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/16/medicare-medicaid-popularity-high-ahead-of-birthday
.html [https://penna.cc/R6ZL-S64E].
176 Roosa Tikkanen et al., International Health Care System Profiles, India, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND (June 5, 2020), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/international
-health-policy-center/countries/india [https://penna.cc/U7QV-BLEX].
177 Roosa Tikkanen et al., InternationalHealth Care System Profiles, Canada, THE
COMMONWEALTH FUND (June 5, 2020), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/international
-health-policy-center/countries/canada [https://penna.cc/RGV4-HC68]; Roosa Tikkanen et
al., InternationalHealth Care System Profiles, Denmark, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND
(June 5, 2020), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/international-health-policy-center
/countries/denmark [https://perma.cc/K7NX-USAQ].
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insurance (e.g., Netherlands).17 8 But, for our purposes, it is sufficient
to posit the existence of some system by which everyone enjoys
coverage of their healthcare needs. Medicare is probably the most
salient model for how this could (or would) be accomplished in the
United States Indeed, several of the specific bills introduced in
Congress, and/or otherwise touted by political candidates have been
characterized as "Medicare-for-All" bills,1 79 to capitalize on the
general popularity of Medicare.1 80 The U.S. experience with Medicare
makes it an attractive model, as Medicare provides excellent precedent
for the host of administrative issues that would arise in the course of
implementing Universal Care in the United States.
B. How Universal Care Addresses Issues in the
U.S. Healthcare System
Universal Care offers a number of advantages for healthcare
delivery in the United States, but most of these are beyond the scope of
this article. The key element is that it would be universal, so every tort
victim in the United States would be able to tap Universal Care to cover
their medical services, having no need to sue for those expenses. There
are a few other advantages in particular that are worth noting, as they
reflect on the operation of the tort system. These are summarized in the
bullet points below.

178 The Dutch system is far more effective than the ACA ever was at ensuring that
everyone is insured. Those who fail to acquire the insurance are penalized for their failure
to do so (much as the ACA in its original form did). However, if an individual does not
purchase insurance within six months, the government buys the insurance for that individual
and charges that person the full cost of the insurance plus twenty percent. Under this system,
more than ninety-nine percent of the population has coverage; therefore, the Dutch system
is one that resembles Universal Care unlike the ACA. Scott, supra note 171; see also
Davies, supra note 7, at 125-30.
179 CompareMedicare-for-All and PublicPlanProposals,KFF (May 15, 2019), https://
www.kff.org/interactive/compare-medicare-for-all-public-plan-proposals/
[https://perma
.cc/9WLP-VS92].
180 It is also easier to defend an idea against the label of "socialism" or "socialized
medicine" and the scare campaign such labels serve if it is characterized as a mere
expansion of a longstanding, and generally popular, government program such as Medicare.
See generally Public Opinion on Single-Payer, National Health Plans, and Expanding
Access to Medicare Coverage, KFF (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.kff.org/slideshow/public
-opinion-on-single-payer-national-health-plans-and-expanding-access-to-medicare-coverage/
[https://perma.cc/8PVU-V3MC].
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*

The potential to be less expensive overall-increased taxes
should be offset by corresponding relief from healthcare/
insurance costs, which taxpayers currently bear.' 8

*

Lower transaction costs with streamlined administration.1 8

*

Potential for more efficient allocation of healthcare resources.1 8

*

A shift in bargaining power would allow the healthcare system
to obtain better rates on pharmaceuticals, equipment, etc.1 84

2
3

181 There is no doubt that the new system would be expensive, and that taxes would need
to be raised to pay for it. But people would be relieved of the burden of buying health
insurance and paying for health care up to their deductible limit. These out-of-pocket
expenditures for health insurance and health care have risen dramatically for American
families over the past fifty years. In aggregate terms, Americans pay around $1.6 trillion in
federal income tax each year and pay $3.5 trillion for health care and health insurance. Erica
York, Summary of the Latest FederalIncome Tax Data, 2022 Update, TAx FOUND.

(Jan.

20, 2022), https://taxfoundation.org/publications/latest-federal-income-tax-data/
[https://
perma.cc/6SQW-LKL4]; Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Americans Shelled Out $10,739 PerPerson
on Health Care Last Year, but Growth in Spending Slows, CNBC (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www
.cnbc.com/2018/12/06/americans-shelled-out-10739-per-person-on-healthcare-last-year.html
[https://penna.cc/ZB96-DMPG]. So, on average, Americans' tax bill could triple to cover
Universal Care. We'd still be ahead if Americans didn't have to pay for their health care
anymore. In other words, if tax payments went up from $1.5 trillion to $4.5 trillion (a tripling
of federal income tax liability), $3 trillion would be generated to cover healthcare, and
Americans would be spending less on healthcare than the $3.5 trillion they currently spend

on it.
182 There are compelling reasons to believe that transaction costs and administrative
costs would be better contained by a system of Universal Care, resulting in lower overall
costs for the system. First, taking the private insurance companies (and their profits) out of
the mix could end up lowering overall costs for the system. Second, because medical
providers would get paid for every patient they treat, there would no longer be a need to
overcharge paying patients to compensate for those patients whose bills would be
uncollectible absent Universal Care. Obviating the expense of "writing off' uncollectible
debts, or resorting to debt collection practices, would bring down the cost of care as well.
183 It has long been believed, for example, that a reduction in the number of uninsured
will reduce reliance on emergency rooms, one of the most expensive places to get care.
President Barack Obama explained the concept in a 2016 speech:
[A] lot of people just didn't bother getting health insurance at all. And when they
got sick, they'd have to go to the emergency room. . . . [B]ut the emergency room
is the most expensive place to get care. And because you weren't insured, the
hospital would have to give you the care for free, and they would have to then
make up for those costs by charging everybody else more money.
Remarks by the President on the Affordable Care Act, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 20,
2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/20/remarks-president
-affordable-care-act [https://penna.cc/DXL9-2ZSV]. But see Carolyn Y. Johnson, The
Uninsured Are Overusing Emergency Rooms-and Other Health-Care Myths, WASH.

POST (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/27/the
-uninsured-are-overusing-emergency-rooms-and-other-health-care-myths/ [https://penna.cc
/75Q6-KGPV] (discussing more recent research that disputes this conventional wisdom).
184 One of the reasons the market for healthcare fails to produce efficient free-market
outcomes is that consumer demand for healthcare is so inelastic. See RINGEL ET AL., supra
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The pros and cons of Universal Care have been, and undoubtedly
will be, debated in far greater detail and with far greater nuance
elsewhere. The topic is demanding considerable attention in the
policymaking sphere, and there is plenty of room for good faith
disagreements about whether the anticipated benefits listed above are
realistic. Universal Care's merits will certainly be disputed, especially
as there are so many well-funded stakeholders invested in the status
quo. But the problems with our current healthcare and health insurance
systems are so severe that the status quo is simply unacceptable. The
issue will have to be confronted.

V
HOW UNIVERSAL CARE MAY ADDRESS ISSUES IN THE
U.S. TORT SYSTEM

What has been largely overlooked in this debate, however, is how
Universal Care would affect the tort system-more specifically how it
is likely to help address some of the more serious and intractable
problems that the tort system faces. One major theme that emerges
from the survey of problems in the tort system discussed above is that
the tort system has become too obsessed with the goal of compensating
victims-something it is poorly designed to do. And that, in turn, is
creating problems and anomalies in both tort doctrine and tort practice.

note 126. In other words, consumer demand for healthcare, and more particularly for critical
or life-saving treatment, does not respond strongly to price changes; this enables the seller
of such services to hike up the price without driving their customers away. At the same time,
competition, which should be a restraining force on prices, fails because the full costs of
medical services are rarely known to consumers until after the services have been rendered.
See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text. Under Universal Care, however, the one
paying and bargaining for medical services would be the provider of Universal Care (the
U.S. government in a "Medicare-for-All" regime), which would not be subject to the
information deficits that presently handicap healthcare consumers in bargaining. As the sole
purchaser of healthcare services, the government would enjoy monopsony power, allowing
it to capture the lion's share of bargaining surpluses for the benefit of healthcare consumers.
See Robert D. Blair & Wenche Wang, Bilateral Monopoly, Two-Sided Markets, and the EBooks Conspiracy, 69 U. MIA. L. REV. CAVEAT 7, 7 (2015) ("Monopsony power refers to
the single buyer's ability to depress the purchase price below the competitive level by
restricting the quantity purchased."). The government would, of course, be able to bargain
for better rates (much as happens with Medicare now), removing the ability for medical
providers to engage in price gouging of vulnerable and desperate consumers of their
services. Of course, health insurance companies have effectively utilized their bargaining
power to control costs, entitling their customers to get better rates for healthcare than the
uninsured can. But Universal Care would give everyone, not just the insured, the benefit of
such bargained-for rates.
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Universal Care would provide compensation for what is perhaps the
most urgent and immediate need of accident victims-their medical
expenses-and correspondingly ease the degree to which individuals
must depend on the tort system for relief. By providing compensation
through Universal Care, we can at least partially unburden the tort
system of this mismatched policy objective and allow the tort system
to focus on its more compelling purposes: corrective justice and
deterrence.
A. Universal Care Would Reduce Tort Claims
As a starting point, we should recognize the role of exorbitant
medical expenses in the typical tort claim. For the average American,
even one with health insurance, the costs of medical care incurred
in the event of an accident can be devastating. Hospitalization alone
is expensive, but a wide range of medical expenses get tacked on:
doctor examination, specialist examination, surgery, emergency room
charges, ambulance services, life-flight helicopter services,18 5 x-rays,
radiologist services, anesthetic, anesthesiologists, medications,
physical therapy, etc. As suggested above, one of the best ways to get
through the financial crisis that accompanies an injury is to find
someone else to pay those costs, and after the victim exhausts their own
financial and insurance resources, the next resort is to look for a deep
pocket that can be made to pay these charges. Hence, victims feel
compelled to file a tort claim.
We see many cases where the medical expenses are the primary
motivator. Consider one lawsuit-labeled "ridiculous" by the popular
press and social media-where an aunt sued her eight-year-old nephew
for injuries she sustained when he gave her an overenthusiastic hug and
knocked her down.1 86 There are a number of things wrong with this
picture, of course.1 8 7 It is easy to blame the #Auntfromfell or plaintiffs'
personal injury lawyers for lawsuits like this. But the lawsuit only looks
ridiculous until one realizes that suits like this are motivated by the
185 The author lives in a rural location where helicopter life-flights are routine. Some
people in this community buy special life-flight insurance. But without that insurance (or if
the company that conducts the life-flight is one not covered by the insurance), the bill for
the helicopter trip can be in the tens of thousands of dollars.
186 Abby Phillip, Aunt Loses Lawsuit Against 12-Year-Old Nephew Who Broke Her
Wrist with a 'Careless'Hug, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.wasingtonpost
.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/10/13/aunt-sues-12-year-old-nephew-who-broke-her-wrist
-with-a-careless-hug/ [https://perma.cc/F3Y5-6KQH].
187 The story depicts our worst nightmares of an overly litigious society where even
loving family relationships are tainted, or destroyed, by lawsuits between family members.
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need to pay medical bills.' 8 8 The nephew's family had liability
insurance, and the aunt had unpaid medical bills; she sued in an effort
to get those bills covered.1 89 Some might blame our tort system for
tolerating suits of this nature.190 But consider Professor Tom Baker's
comment on the above case:
One of the main things that predicts whether someone brings a
lawsuit is whether they have medical needs that are not met by their
health insurance. When I hear about it, I don't think 'That terrible
greedy aunt'. I think, 'She probably didn't get all her health expenses
paid'. You might say that's the real problem.191

Despite Professor Baker's observations, it is rare that anyone blames
the healthcare system for "ridiculous" lawsuits like this. But there is no
doubt that many of these lawsuits are driven by the fact that the medical
bills are too high or that there was no other way for the accident victim
(e.g., the aunt) to pay them. As noted above, medical care is
dramatically more expensive in the United States than elsewhere. 192
At the same time, much of America is underinsured (or uninsured)as many as 43.4% of U.S. adults ages nineteen to sixty-four are
"inadequately insured"-against these kinds of injuries.1 9 3 The tort
system, therefore, becomes the vehicle for addressing the problem of
high medical costs that an injured person cannot even begin to pay'94despite the fact that the tort system is a spectacularly inefficient vehicle
for compensating accident victims.
Note, in contrast, that if medical expenses were more reasonable and
compensated for everyone across the board, there would be no reason
for this lawsuit or, in all probability, tens (perhaps hundreds) of
188 Olivia Goldhill, If You Sensed Something Off About the Story of the Woman
Who Sued Her Nephew, You Were Right, QUARTZ (Oct. 22, 2015), https://qz.com/526941/if
-you-sensed-something-off-about-the-story-of-the-woman-who-sued-her-nephew-you-were
-right/ [https://penna.cc/7H6C-9WJJ].
189 Eric Levitz, Aunt From Hell'Says She Sued Young Relative to Access Homeowner's
Insurance, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 14, 2015), https://nymag.com/intelligencer
/2015/10/aunt-from-hell-had-her-reasons.html [https://perma.cc/TR7T-XD67].
190 The jury ultimately denied the aunt's claim. Phillip, supra note 186.
191 Goldhill, supra note 188.
192 See Wager, supra note 135.
193 Sara R. Collins et al., U.S. Health Insurance Coveragein 2020: A Looming Crisis in
Affordability, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.commonwealth
fund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2020/aug/looming-crisis-health-coverage-2020-biennial
[https://perma.cc/97P6-BSQ9].
194 Indeed, the absence of compensation vehicles may render the tort claim as the firstresort vehicle for addressing the problem of high medical costs that an injured person can't
afford to pay.
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thousands of others each year-many of which may strain at theories
of liability in a desperate attempt to provide compensation to a hapless
victim of injury.1 95 In other words, Universal Care would remove the
primary motivation for lawsuits of this nature, and the injured aunts of
the world would get the care they need and never think of suing their
nephews. Again, The Economist may have had it right when it said that
"the best way to slash the number of lawsuits would be to fix . . [the]
health-care system."196
B. Universal Care Would Reduce PersonalInjury Damages Other
thanMedical Expenses
1. Inefficiencies in Tort-Based CompensationDrive Claims in Excess
ofMedical Expenses
Lawsuits do not limit themselves to claims for medical expenses.
Plaintiffs inevitably seek additional damages, including lost wages and
sizeable claims for pain and suffering. These additional claims make it
look a little more like plaintiffs-such as the aunt discussed aboveare profiteering from the system, attempting to cash in on outsized tort
awards. But note that if the aunt claimed only the medical expenses in
the lawsuit, and was awarded all of them, she would still be severely
undercompensated due to the high transaction costs-the attorneys'
fees would take a sizeable chunk of her recovery. In order to obtain her
full medical expenses and pay her lawyer, she needs to claim much
more than the medical expenses. It is reasonable and rational, therefore,
to look for additional claims like pain and suffering that can generate a
recovery large enough to pay the medical expenses and the lawyers.
The seeking of excess claims might be characterized as a means of
covering the high transaction costs in a system where the compensation
is not guaranteed but fought for in an expensive adversarial system. As
Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court observed,
"[A]wards for pain and suffering serve to ease plaintiffs' discomfort

195 See STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL., U.S. DEPT. JUST., NCJ-153177, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN SPECIAL REPORT: TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES 1 (1995)

("During a 1-year period ending in 1992, State courts of general jurisdiction in the Nation's
75 largest counties disposed of an estimated 378,000 tort cases involving 1.4 million
plaintiffs and defendants.").
196 O'Connell, supra note 77, at 1304 (quoting THE ECONOMIST); see also Sugarman,
supra note 20, at 2434-35 ("The simple point here is that if tort were only to compensate
for losses not otherwise covered, and if those collateral sources grow, then tort would
recede.... [T]he adoption of comprehensive health insurance could play a role here.").
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and to pay for attorney fees for which plaintiffs are not otherwise
compensated."1 97

Moreover, if the plaintiff is suing for medical expenses anyway,
"[t]he availability of damages for pain and suffering, in turn, often
induces plaintiffs (assisted, indeed prodded, by their lawyers) to inflate
their damage assessments and exaggerate their actual injuries."1 98 If
the need to pay medical expenses is prompting the lawsuit in the first
place, and all the costs of suit will be borne in any case, there is little
reason to hold back from aggressive pursuit of pain and suffering
damages as well.
Under Universal Care, that plaintiff is far less likely to sue at all.1 99
Universal Care would cover the medical expenses incurred, perhaps in
full, so there would be no need to file a claim for those expenses. The
injured person could decide whether to sue for pain and suffering,
economic losses (such as lost wages), or for punitive damages, but
would do so knowing that the medical expenses are already paid in full.
There would be no need to "tack on" these additional damages claims
in order to get full and adequate compensation for the medical care, and
if no suit is brought, there is no occasion to pile on, inflate, or
exaggerate pain and suffering claims.
2. Pain and Suffering Awards Are Inflated by Rising Medical
Expenses
As medical expenses have skyrocketed, tort awards have
skyrocketed right along with them, at least until tort reform initiatives
started capping medical expenses.2 oo One reason for this is the fact that
medical expenses leverage all other components of a personal injury

197 Seffertv. L.A. Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 345 (Cal. 1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
198 Jeffrey O'Connell & Ralph M. Muoio, The Beam in Thine Eye: JudicialAttitudes
Toward "Early Offer" Tort Reform, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 491, 495 (1997).
199 Sugarman, supra note 20, at 2434-35.
200 Erik Moller, Trends in Civil Jury Verdicts: New Datafrom 15 Jurisdictions,RAND
(1996), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9025.html [https://perma.cc/B5JD
-UL5U]. See Benjamin A. Geslison & Kevin T. Jacobs, The CollateralSource Rule and
Medical Expenses: Anticipated Effects of the Affordable Care Act and Recent State Case
Law on Damagesin PersonalInjury Lawsuits, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 239, 244 (2013) ("[I]n the

vast majority of personal injury cases, the settlement amount or the damages awarded by the
verdict were tied closely to the actual damages primarily lost wages and medical costs
incurred as a result of the injury.").
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claim. 2 0 ' Insurance adjustors routinely use the medical expenses as a
basis for estimating pain and suffering allowances-usually by applying
a simple multiple to the medical expenses. 20 2 So if the medical
expenses double, the expected pain and suffering award doubles right
along with them.
Under Universal Care, by contrast, the medical expenses are already
covered and not part of the claim for damages. Accordingly, those
expenses-already presumably lower, as Universal Care should
function to keep medical expenses down-are unlikely to form a
baseline from which other damages are extrapolated. It is easy to see
how a jury, already awarding hundreds of thousands in medical
expenses, might be willing to give pain and suffering awards similarly
measured in the hundreds of thousands. But if the special damages are
off the table (thanks to Universal Care) or comparatively small-e.g.,
limited to co-pays or deductibles paid by the plaintiff-it will be a
much harder sell for plaintiffs' lawyers to argue for pain and suffering
damages that are exponentially higher.
3. Punitive Damage Awards Are Inflated by Rising Medical Expenses
Punitive damages are anchored to compensatory damages in a
similar way. The Supreme Court acknowledged as much in BMW v.
Gore, and again in State Farm v. Campbell. In those cases, the Supreme
Court articulated that the constitutionality of a punitive damages
award should be assessed, in part, by examining the ratio between
compensatory damages (including medical expenses) and punitive
damages. 2 0 3 State Farm suggests that punitive damages that are four
201 Seffert, 364 P.2d at 346 (Justice Traynor observed in 1961 that pain and suffering
awards at that time rarely exceeded the pecuniary losses: "A review of reported cases
involving serious injuries and large pecuniary losses reveals that ordinarily the part of the
verdict attributable to pain and suffering does not exceed the part attributable to pecuniary

losses.").
202 "[A]n insurance adjuster usually adds up the total medical expenses related to the
injury.... That's the base figure the adjuster uses to figure out how much to pay the injured
person for pain, suffering, and other nonmonetary losses .... " David Goguen, How Do
Insurers Value an Injury Claim?, NOLO, https://www.nolo.comllegal-encyclopedia/how
-do-insurers-value-injury-29976.htm [https://penna.cc/FM6S-864P]. "When the injuries
are relatively minor, the adjuster might multiply the amount of special damages by 1.5 or 2.
When the injuries are particularly painful, serious, or long-lasting, the adjuster could
multiply the amount of special damages by up to 5." Id.; see also O'Connell & Muoio, supra
note 198, at 496 ("It has long been an open secret among adjusters that, where liability is
determined to be likely, they will often eventually settle claims for some multiple of a
claimant's out-of-pocket damages.").
203 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996); State FarmMut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
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times, or even up to nine times, the amount of compensatory damages
are presumptively constitutional as a matter of due process. 20 4
Accordingly, if medical expenses increase by a certain amount, the
constitutionally permissible award of punitive damages in that same
case may increase by up to nine times that amount. If medical expenses
are not a part of the claim, the permissible punitive damages award may
be dramatically reduced, by as much as nine times the amount of
medical expenses that would have been claimed absent Universal Care.
Thus, the implementation of Universal Care may avoid situations
where high medical costs are used to justify high punitive damage
awards. If medical costs are not part of the claim, the baseline for
punitive damage awards will no longer be indexed to what have been
high, and rising, costs of medical care.
C. Juries Will Feel Less Compulsion to Rule in Favor of Sympathetic
Plaintiffs if Those PlaintiffsAre Getting Universal Care
Under the current regime, jurors are likely to be moved by the plight
of a plaintiff who faces ruinous medical bills, and they may be more
likely to rule against an affluent defendant and find liability, if only
to afford some relief to a penurious plaintiff.2 o5 Although juries'
tendencies to act this way is disputed, it is a perception widely shared,
and dating back at least as far as 1852, when a New York court
observed:
We can not shut our eyes to the fact that in certain controversies
between the weak and the strong-between a humble individual and
a gigantic corporation, the sympathies of the human mind naturally,
honestly and generously, run to the assistance and support of the
feeble, and apparently oppressed; and that compassion will
sometimes exercise over the deliberations of a jury, an influence
which, however honorable to them as philanthropists, is wholly
inconsistent with the principles of law and the ends of justice.2 0 6

In 1989, Peter Huber suggested that by the 1970s and 80s "judges and
juries were, for the most part, committed to running a generous sort of
charity. If the new tort system cannot find a careless defendant after an
accident, it will often settle for a merely wealthy one." 207
204 Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.
205 Bornstein, supra note 98, at 1495 (noting that jurors are more likely to find liability
and to award damages where the plaintiff's injury is more severe).
206 Haring v. N.Y. & Erie R.R., 13 Barb. 9, 15-16 (N.Y. 1852).
207 PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 12

(1989). See also the array of sources quoted and cited in Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence
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The existence of Universal Care is likely to undercut this effect. If
juries know that the medical bills are already paid, they may adjudge
the defendant's liability more critically and be less generous with the
defendant's (or the defendant's insurer's) money. It is a reasonable
assumption that a jury may be more willing to be fair to a deep-pocket
defendant if the jurors know that the plaintiff is already getting all her
basic medical needs met.
Admittedly, it is somewhat speculative to assume that a jury will be
less generous to a plaintiff if they are aware that the plaintiff is insured
and already being compensated for her medical care. But this
assumption is the reason behind rules of evidence, 208 such as Evidence
Rule 411 and the collateral source rule, both of which prevent the jury
from knowing whether there is insurance available to pay the claim. 209
The assumption behind these rules is that knowledge of insurance will
influence the jury because (1) knowledge that the plaintiff is already
insured against this loss is likely to result in a diminished jury award;
and (2) knowledge that the defendant is insured is likely to result in a
judgment for the plaintiff, even if the defendant's fault is arguable
(because the jury knows that a nonnegligent defendant won't be paying
the judgment anyway).
If everyone is covered by Universal Care, the jury will undoubtedly
know that-no rule of evidence will shield them from that knowledge.
And, depending on how subrogation is treated in the ultimate
legislation,2 1 o the medical expenses are unlikely to be part of the
claim at all. The otherwise resourceless plaintiff no longer looks so
vulnerable, because her health care is provided for. As a result, the jury
may feel less pressure to find for the plaintiff, and the nonnegligent
defendant is far less likely to be stuck with the bill for injuries that are
really not that defendant's fault.

on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical
MalpracticeCases, 43 Duke L.J. 217, 218-21 (1993).
208 J. E. Lyerly, Evidence: Revealing the Existence of Defendant's Liability Insurance
to the Jury, 6 CUMB. L. REV. 123, 123 (1975).
209 John G. Fleming, The CollateralSource Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1478, 1478 (1966).
210 See discussion of subrogation, infra Section V.D.1.
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D. AdditionalIssues Related to Tort Claims Under Universal Care
1. The CollateralSource Rule and Subrogation
There are a few issues of tort law that would need to be resolved as
part of the Universal Care implementation. These include the
applicability of the collateral source rule and the availability of
subrogation.
We have assumed, throughout this article, that the plaintiff would be
barred from claiming damages for medical expenses incurred if those
expenses are being covered by Universal Care. 2 1 ' Unless the plaintiff
is actually pursuing those expenses, there is little reason to concern
ourselves with the collateral source rule. The rule operates to prohibit
the parties from alerting the jury that compensation has already been
received from the Universal Care system, and it is operative only if the
plaintiff is seeking damages for expenses for which they have already
been reimbursed. Moreover, as noted above, it would be impossible to
keep the jury ignorant of the plaintiff's entitlement to Universal Care
in any case.
A related but distinct issue is the question of subrogation: whether
the Universal Care system should have the right to pursue a subrogated
claim for medical costs that the Universal Care system has borne, but
which were occasioned by the defendants' tortious behavior.
Compelling arguments can be made either way, and Professor
Schwartz explores and analyzes these arguments in some detail.2 12
Some would argue that relieving defendants of the burden of paying
for the medical services occasioned by their tortious behavior prevents
them from internalizing the costs of their behavior.2 1 3 As a matter of
strict economics, this is true: absent liability for the plaintiff's medical
care, the defendant lacks sufficient incentive to take appropriate
precautions and exercise an efficient degree of care.214
On the other hand, if the public fisc-funded by taxpayersis already compensating the plaintiff for medical expenses, there
may be enormous efficiencies that come from forgoing the battles
over liability. This was much of the impetus behind No-Fault Auto;

211 Indeed, many of the efficiencies the tort system would recognize from the
implementation of Universal Care, discussed in Section V.B., would evaporate if plaintiffs
were able to pursue these expenses a second time in a suit against the alleged tortfeasor(s).
212 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1341-48.
213 Id. at 1347.
214 Id.
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decreasing transaction costs was one of the primary goals and benefits
of that system.2 1 5 What was lost in terms of incentives to potential
tortfeasors was arguably more than made up for in terms of savings to
the system, as compensation could be done without resorting to costly
legal battles over which party was at fault. 2 16
As Professor Schwartz concludes, there are no clear answers as to
whether allowing the Universal Care administrator to pursue subrogated
claims would be beneficial:
In evaluating the subrogation option, one needs an estimate of how
much deterrence in fact would be lost if the liability of tortfeasors
were reduced. . .. At this point, the economists' models should be
supplemented by a realistic and perhaps skeptical appraisal as to how
much deterrence the current tort system actually provides. Moreover,
evaluation of the option should also acknowledge that subrogation
carries with it a considerable overhead, the cost of which must be
debited against whatever the deterrence advantages of subrogation
might be. Indeed, these overhead costs are sometimes prohibitive,
persuading insurers to make no effort to enforce their subrogation
rights. 2 17

He follows this with an example from the auto insurance environment
in which subrogation has become routine and functions smoothly. 2 18
But the case for subrogation is dubious, and the potential benefits for

215 See Trevor M. Gordon, To Reform or Repudiate? An Argument on the Future of NoFaultAuto Insurance, 17 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 63, 63-66 (2014). The creation and rise
of the automobile introduced Americans to a previously unrealized freedom of inexpensive
convenient travel. Id. at 63. But as the number of drivers on the road skyrocketed in the
twentieth century, so did collisions and, ultimately, litigation. Id. at 64. The courts were
flooded with lawsuits by individuals seeking justice for their injuries, but the process proved
time consuming, expensive, and incapable of properly compensating many victims (notably
those who were victimized by uninsured drivers). Id. In response, the idea of No-Fault auto
insurance was conceived in the 1970s and was modeled after workers compensation
schemes that were already in place. Id. The basic idea was that an injured driver could have
their medical expenses covered by their No-Fault insurance regardless of who was at fault
for the accident. Id. The idea was to eliminate the need for litigation over minor injuries. Id.
Usually, the drivers were insured up to a capped amount and may be permitted to sue if the
expenses exceed that amount or if the injury was particularly severe. Id. at 64-65. The
concept was adopted and implemented differently among the states. Id.
216 Of course, automobile accidents are less of a concern in terms of incentives. Because

accidents also put the tortfeasor herself at risk, she already has a strong incentive to avoid
accidents: her own neck is on the line. Types of torts that do not place the tortfeasor in
similar jeopardy may be less suited to a no-fault system; the lack of liability may prompt
tortfeasors to take unwarranted risks with other people's lives if they know they won't be
held liable for the medical expenses occasioned by their tortious behavior.
217 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1347 (internal footnote omitted).
218 Id. at 1348.

&
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the tort system appear to be most conspicuous in a regime that doesn't
allow it.2 1 9
2. Impact on Medical Malpractice Claims
Finally, no discussion of intersection of the tort system and the
healthcare system would be complete without a discussion of medical
malpractice litigation. No doubt medical malpractice liability, and the
insurance to cover it, have been cited as factors in driving up the cost
of medical services. 2 20 Doctors and hospitals have to pay those
judgments and those insurance premiums somehow. And as it is a "cost
of doing business," it only makes sense to pass those costs on to their
patients. 2 1
Passing costs on to a customer, of course, is possible only to the
degree that there is some inelasticity of demand, however.2 2 2 In
competitive markets, where there are substitute goods or services
available to the consumer, the seller may well be forced to swallow
increased costs; raising prices would simply chase their customers to
competing sellers and products. 2 2 3

219 Note that the North Carolina Department of Insurance prohibited subrogation clauses
in North Carolina insurance policies decades ago, so a world without subrogation is hardly
an untested concept. See, e.g., In Re A Declaratory Ruling by the N.C. Comm'r of Ins.
Regarding 11 N.C.A.C. 12.0319, 517 S.E.2d 134, 135 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999). The North
Carolina rule has been consistently upheld by the courts. E.g., id.
220 See Stephen Zuckerman & John Holahan, Despite Criticism, The Affordable Care
Act Does Much to Contain Health Care Costs, URBAN INSTITUTE (Oct. 2012), http://
webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412665-Despite-Criticism-The-Affordable-Care-Act
-Does-Much-to-Contain-Health-Care-Cost.pdf [https://penna.cc/Q2RY-JV3R]. On the
other hand, some argue that the costs related to medical malpractice are not a substantial
healthcare-cost driver as most assume. Michael D. Frakes, The Surprising Relevance of
Medical MalpracticeLaw, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 359-60 (2015).
221 See, e.g., Mark Pauly et al., Who Pays? The Incidence of High Malpractice
Premiums, F. HEALTH ECON. &POL'Y, 2006, at 1, 8. ("by a combination of increasing prices
and increasing quantity of (apparently) profitable outputs, the group practice physicians we
studied appear able and willing to offset the effect of higher premiums on their incomes.").
Even if it is the insurance companies that pay for these cost shifts, it ultimately transfers to
the patients in the form of higher medical insurance premiums. See Katherine Baicker
Amitabh Chandra, Defensive Medicine andDisappearingDoctors?, 28 REGUL. 24, 30-31
(2005).
222 PRINCIPLES OF ECON., Sec. 5.3 Elasticity andPricing, https://opentextbc.ca/principles
ofeconomics/chapter/5-3 -elasticity-and-pricing/ [https://penna.cc/6YNM-GWQV].
223 Amy Gallo, A Refresher on Price Elasticity, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 21, 2015),
https://hbr.org/2015/08/a-refresher-on-price-elasticity [https://perma.cc/K2D7-BX8Q].
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But as noted above, health care may be one of the services for which
demand is particularly inelastic,2 24 enabling the health care provider to
pass a very large portion of increased costs on to their customers
(patients). Due to the market failures discussed above, the patients have
few other options in terms of finding alternative providers, and often
cannot consider "doing without" the medical care, as fundamental
issues such as life, death, pain, and disability are not amenable to a
monetized trade-off 2 2 5
However, medical malpractice claims are, by definition, personal
injury claims, and the availability of Universal Care should-for all the
reasons argued above-dramatically reduce the number of claims, as
well as the amounts size of the claims that are filed. Patients would
more reliably get the medical expense compensation and wouldn't need
to prove the doctor's fault to get it. 226
Moreover, if Universal Care does reduce medical malpractice
claims-the cost of which is typically blamed, in part, for the spike in
the costs of health care in the United States-it could end up fostering
a "virtuous cycle" of cost reductions: fewer claims, less defensive
medicine, lower costs, and a larger percentage of the resources going
to actual care. And, perhaps most importantly, this easing of the burden
on healthcare providers, unlike most tort reform initiatives designed to
address medical malpractice issues, does not come at the expense of
victims. Many of those claims are diverted from the tort system not
because tort reform has limited their ability to get compensation, but
because the needed compensation has already been provided by a
functional system of Universal Care.

224 Mary Hall, Elasticity vs. Inelasticity of Demand: What's the Difference?,
INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/012915/what
-difference-between-inelasticity-and-elasticity-demand.asp [https://perma.cc/KAX4-8VUL]
("The most common goods with inelastic demand are utilities, prescription drugs, and
tobacco products. In general, necessities and medical treatments tend to be inelastic .... ").
225 Melnick, supra note 127.
226 Similar policy considerations underlie Paul Weiler's provocative but compelling
argument in favor of no-fault medical liability. Weiler, supra note 107, at 921-22
("[C]overage for patient losses will not turn on the fortuitous question whether the injury
can be proved to be the result of the negligence of a doctor or other provider proof that
requires more monetary expenditures than does payment to the few patients who
successfully litigate that issue.").
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VI
LETTING THE TORT SYSTEM FOCUS ON ITS HISTORICAL AND
TRADITIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES: CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
AND DETERRENCE

The struggle to reconcile tort doctrine with its divergent aimscorrective justice (forcing wrongdoers to pay for the harm they cause),
deterrence (providing incentives to take appropriate precautions), and
compensation (ensuring that victims of accidents can get compensation
for their injuries)-has been frustrating and unsatisfying. Torts
scholars are bitterly divided, as these policy objectives often
conflict.2 27 The compensation priority has been particularly disruptive
of the tort system and has engendered considerable backlash, including
the tort reform movement in the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries. Perhaps the greatest benefit Universal Care will bring to the
tort system, therefore, is relieving the pressure on that system to
function as a compensation scheme for accident victims. The tort
system is ill-suited to play this role in any case as it provides
meaningful compensation to only a tiny fraction of injured persons in
America 2 2 8-and at tremendous cost in both time and money. 2 2 9
The focus on the plight of the victim, and the imperative to find a
way to compensate her, has prompted tort rules that force deep pockets
to pay regardless of their degree of culpability (e.g., strict products
liability, joint and several liability, 2 30 and vicarious liability), and rules
that justify plaintiffs' recovery in terms of cost-spreading. 23 1 These
trends have sparked outrage by observers, who understandably wonder
where they can find justice in a system that punishes defendants whose
degree of fault is disproportionately small compared to the liability they
are forced to bear.2 3 2 And tort doctrines that make large awards,
regardless of the defendants' level of culpability, prompt dismay from
those concerned about how fear of liability may stifle innovation,
See Goldberg, supra note 16.
See Saks, supra note 9, at 1184-84 (giving data on medical malpractice claims in
particular).
227

228

229 See supra Part II.
230 Deborah J. La Fetra, Freedom, Responsibility, and Risk: FundamentalPrinciples

Supporting TortReform, 36 IND. L. REV. 645, 681-82 (2003).
231 See Geistfeld, supra note 16. See also, Hasnas, supra note 35, at 574 ("Juries do
indeed tend to find in favor of the plaintiff, and issue large awards, when given instructions
derived from a theory of tort that regards placing the cost burden of injuries on the parties
best able to bear it as a requirement of social justice.").
232 La Fetra, supra note 230, at 681-82.
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competition, and healthy risk-taking,2 3 3 and about how our culture has
evolved to encourage blaming others rather than taking personal
responsibility for unfortunate outcomes.234
The key losses claimed in most personal injury suits-the
objectively measurable pecuniary damages-are medical expenses and
lost wages. These, as discussed above, 2 3 5 are the most pressing needs
of an injured accident victim. 2 3 6 Universal Care takes the first one off
the table almost completely, although limitations on coverage may still
prompt suits for the expenses that Universal Care does not cover,
including any deductibles or copayments. 237 The second one remains
a part of the mix, so tort claims will still be necessary to obtain
compensation for forgone income. 238 But without the medical
expenses, the incentive-and in many cases the necessity-to pursue a
tort claim against any and all available deep pockets is tempered
considerably. We should expect fewer suits, and those filed should be
claiming considerably smaller amounts.
So which tort claims would still be pursued under a regime that
afforded Universal Care? The answer is likely to be those cases that the
tort system has historically treated as worthy of recovery: where the
defendant's conduct is genuinely blameworthy, where the defendant
disregards the rights and the safety of others, and where the defendant's
conduct is egregious enough to demand legal intervention to hold them
accountable. Plaintiffs should still be able to get significant recoveries
in such cases, as juries will be eager to find liability, and assess
substantial damages, against especially callous tortfeasors. In such
233 Hearing on ProductLiabilityLaws, supra note 95, at

1-2.

234 See, e.g., La Fetra, supra note 230, at 658.
235 See supra Section II.B.1.
236 See Robinette, supra note 75, at 347.
237 There may be other limitations as well. Medicare, for example, depending in part on
whether the individual chooses optional supplemental plans, may not cover dental care,
custodial care, hearing aids, or prescription lenses. What's not covered by PartA & PartB?,
MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/whats-not-covered-by
-part-a-part-b [https://penna.cc/A9WP-QHBH].
238 One might envision, however, a system of universal disability insurance or
unemployment insurance that would ease pressure on plaintiffs who lost income,
eliminating (or diminishing) the need or incentive to sue for such losses. Even a guaranteed
income system such as that advocated by presidential candidate Andrew Yang in 2020,
could contribute to easing the financial desperation of accident victims, and therefore their
incentives to resort to the tort system for relief. Eric Latch, Andrew Yang's Ideas on
Universal Basic Income Earned Him Fans. But Can He Win Votes?, THE NEW YORKER

(Jan. 23, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-local-correspondents/andrew-yangs
-ideas-on-universal-basic-income-earned-him-fans-but-can-he-win-votes [https://penna.cc
/8XJH-8TAK].
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cases, therefore, there will still be incentives to sue. The threat of
litigation and liability should still be potent enough to deter potential
tortfeasors from engaging in seriously negligent or reckless conduct;
even if there is no litigation over medical costs, the system should still
demand an ample measure of accountability.
But the problem of over-deterrence-e.g., when cities close
playgrounds or public swimming pools because they can't risk
liability, 2 39 where doctors engage in "defensive medicine,"24o or when
useful products are kept off the market because they can't be made
100% idiot-proof-may well ease. 2 4 1 And with the anticipated drop in
the number, and magnitude, of tort claims, it is likely that the putative
"tort crisis" will dissipate considerably.
At the same time, when medical expenses are covered, other
plaintiff-friendly or compensation-oriented tort doctrines may be
gently scaled back or even retired, such as (1) strict liability for injuries
caused by products, when the defendant's-either the manufacturer's
or the retailer's-fault cannot be shown; (2) vicarious liability, when
the employer had no reason to know or suspect that its employee may
be behaving in a negligent manner; or (3) joint and several liability,
which functions to force deep-pocketed defendants to pay far more than
their fair share of the plaintiff's damages. Professor Schwartz suggests
as much:
If a national health care program is adopted, judges would be aware
that the insurance mandated by federal law now covers accident
victims for the medical care they need. Granted, those victims'
income losses would remain; still, judges might be less inclined to
rely on loss-spreading notions to approve either individual verdicts
or new causes of action . . . In short, the implementation of a national
program would tend to constrict both the effective scope and the
242
actual cost of the current regime of tort liability.

Accordingly, tort doctrines that once limited defendant liability-such
as assumption of risk or contributory negligence, which have been
diluted to permit plaintiffs at least some recovery 24 3-might be

239 E.g., Uhlinger, inter alia, supra note 91.
240 See Katz, supra note 94; Sullivan, supra note 94.
241 Hearing on ProductLiabilityLaws, supra note 95, at 1-2.
242 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1354.
243 E.g., Tezak v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 33 F. App'x 172, 175 (6th Cir. 2002)
(plaintiff was awarded damages even though the jury found him to be at ninety-eight percent
fault for the injuries he received); California adopted pure comparative negligence and
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resuscitated if the need to compensate the victim is less acute. 2 44 There
will be less pressure to find defendants liable for what are merely
misfortunes. A plaintiff who is the author of his own misfortune would
be entitled to medical care under Universal Care and would have less
need for a comparative negligence rule (or, at least, a pure comparative
negligence rule) that empowers that plaintiff to tap a deep pocket for a
contribution. A plaintiff whose injury could be attributed to a number
of potential defendants might not need to single out the one with the
deep pocket to carry the full freight of liability under a joint and several
liability rule if the plaintiff's medical needs are already fully covered.
Judges, juries, and legislatures may well think differently about all
these legal rules in a regime where the medical costs are covered. And
that shift in thinking may be just what the tort system needs.
CONCLUSION

Critics of the tort system have found easy targets in the evolving tort
doctrines since the mid-twentieth century, as courts have allowed these
doctrines to develop in ways that favor plaintiffs and give them access
to deep pocketed defendants, motivated in part by the plight of injured
persons facing devastating medical expenses. These doctrines have
unduly focused on ensuring that injured persons can get some
compensation and have justified imposing liability, not so much in
terms of the wrongfulness of defendant's conduct, but in terms of the
defendants' superior ability to bear or spread the costs of such injuries.
In the process, defendants have been treated increasingly as de facto
insurers, driven in part by the fact that health care has become
prohibitively expensive in the United States and so many people lack
adequate health insurance. Injured persons find themselves relying on
the tort system to cover their medical costs, and the tort system has
struggled under the burden of playing that role.
Universal Care has the potential to be a game changer for the tort
system, however. If injured persons have their medical costs already
determined the defense of assumption of risk was merged into the assessment of liability in
proportion to fault. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1241 (Cal. 1975).
244 While it is unlikely that comparative negligence states would revert to the old
contributory negligence regimes they once had, the availability of Universal Care
dramatically undercuts the argument in favor of pure comparative negligence. States that
use pure comparative negligence may be emboldened to adopt modified comparative
negligence, which would deny recovery to plaintiffs who are at least fifty percent
responsible for their injury. Such plaintiffs would have their medical expenses covered by
Universal Care and have much less need for tort liability rules that afford them some
recovery.
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covered, they are far less likely to sue, and those who do bring suit will
be making more modest claims. Those claims, if they are brought at all,
will not include medical expenses and will most often be limited to lost
wages and pain and suffering. The anticipated decrease in the number
and scope of filings would benefit a seriously overburdened system.
But even more important than unburdening the system of these cases
would be the unburdening of the tort system of its perceived role as a
mechanism for compensating injured persons. It compensates only a
small fraction of injured persons even now-and undercompensates
them at that. It also comes at a considerable administrative expense,
both in terms of time and money. The tort system's attempts to play a
role for which it is so ill-suited has invited well-founded criticism of
the system and launched a variety of ill-conceived tort reform
initiatives (particularly those designed to cap or reduce payouts in the
few cases where the system grants recovery), initiatives that do nothing
to further any of the legitimate purposes of the tort system.
But this unfortunate outcome is not a result of the tort system's
failure; it is a case of healthcare system's failure. If we can fix health
care in the United States and remedy the market failures so people who
need health care can get it, the tort system may be liberated from its
present role as a compensation scheme. This would allow the tort
system refocus attention on its more defensible policy objectivescorrective justice and deterrence-and to right itself.
If, instead of pouring societal resources into tort litigation (and the
quest for deep pockets to pay the prohibitive cost of health care),
American society invested in Universal Care, the erstwhile
"compensation policy objective" of the tort system would be far better
served: far more people would get the compensation they really need,
and with dramatically reduced transaction costs. Any transaction costs
saved, of course, would preserve resources that could be better
employed for additional compensation for the accident victims who
need it.
The tort system's ills might yet be healed, if the cause of those ills is
property diagnosed. If the problems are the result of a failed healthcare
system, the best remedy for those problems may lie not in tort reform,
but in healthcare reform. Indeed, from the perspective of the tort
system, Universal Care could be the cure we've all been waiting for.

